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The ideological landscape of post cold-war America is coming
into resolution. Liberal interests, specifically labor and environ-
mental groups, are increasingly apprehensive of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO" or the "Organization"). It is not difficult
to understand why. Thus far, the WTO has been no friend to
these interests. While globalized trade promoted by the WTO
has provided the preconditions for a boom in corporate profits,
American workers are less economically secure and, despite recent
gains, probably less well compensated than in the period before
globalization. Additionally, globalized free trade has imperiled
the environment in ways that the WTO has done nothing to
remedy. These challenges to both labor and the environment are
similar, and in many ways, call for similar responses. Neverthe-
less, in this Article, I will focus on environmental concerns, leav-
ing the question of how labor should respond to the WTO for
another day.
While American environmentalists are not all of one mind,
and have still not decided what their specific answers to the WTO
challenge should be, one response emerging as a contender for
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ideological primacy among environmentalists is what I will label
"environmental isolationism." This response suggests that the
WTO is incompatible with environmental protection and should
be disbanded. Furthermore, the isolationists argue that the
United States should take unilateral action to systematically ban
the importation of goods that are made in ways deemed to cause
unnecessary harm to the environment.
To be sure, environmental isolationism has not been set forth
in a law journal or other academic or popular publication as a
comprehensively fashioned ideological response to the WTO and
the challenges of globalization. In fact, if explicitly considered, it
would probably be rejected by many environmentalists as too ab-
solute. Much of its popular dissemination can probably be traced
to ad homonyms either born of frustration or of a maximalist rhe-
torical strategy designed to gain advantage in various negotiations
rather than as an overarching blueprint for policy. Nevertheless,
because a clear composition built of sound bites is coming
through and influencing popular perceptions, I believe it is impor-
tant to recognize its existence and analyze its implications.
No one has offered more sonic morsels than consumer advo-
cate Ralph Nader.3 Nader opposed the creation of the WTO and
now suggests that the United States should consider abandoning
the Organization. His objections are based not only on the fact
that the Organization does not have an institutional mandate to
deal with environmental concerns, but also on its adverse effects
on workers.
5
' The best place to get an overview of Nader's and his associates' views on
international trade is in THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE: GATT, NAFTA
AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE POwER (Earth Island Press ed.,
1993) [hereinafter THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE].
4 See Ralph Nader, No Child Should Work, USA TODAY, June 12, 1996, at
14A (stating that the U.S. should 'challenge or quit the anti-democratic...
WTO"). Likewise, one of Nader's associates, Lori Wallach, a trade lawyer and
Director of Global Trade Watch for the activist group Pubic Citizen, founded
by Nader, proposes withdrawing from the WTO stating, "[w]e should just get
out of [the WTO]... [i]t's not fixable." Alan Kovski,U.S. Appeals WTO Gaso-
line Ruling: Critics Doubt Prospects, THE OIL DAILY, Feb. 22, 1996, at 3; see
Loraine Woellert, U.S. Loss at WTO Offset by Reversal, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 30,
1996, at B7 (calling for the United States to withdraw from the WTO); see also,
e.g., Alan Tonelson & Lori Wallach, We Told You So: The WTO's First Trade
Decision Vindicates the Warnings of Critics, WASH. POST, May 5, 1996, at C4
(arguing that Congress "should rethink America's participation in the WTO").
See Paul Blustein & Anne Swardson, U.S. Vows to Boycott WTO Panel:
Move Escalates Fight with European Union Over Cuba Sanctions, WASH. POST,
[Vol 19:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss3/3
THE W-TO AND THE ENVIR ONMENT
Perhaps his most vociferous criticism is the WTO's failure to
provide citizen groups with access to its decision-making proc-
esses. Nader's perception is that the "democratic deficit" is made
worse by the ability of the Organization to prescribe rules that
supersede democratically created domestic legislation. He is par-
ticularly concerned that domestic environmental laws are threat-
ened by the WTO.7
Feb. 21, 1997, at Al (noting that Nader has been among those criticizing the
WTO for imperiling U.S. jobs).
6 In a recently published book comparing the past and present role of
American lawyers, Nader emphasizes what he calls "the [General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade] GATT and [North American Free Trade Agreement]
NAFTA systems of autocratic governance." RALPH NADER & WESLEY J.
SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE PERVERSION OF
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 338 (1996). Likewise, in a CNN interview with Bernard
Shaw, referring to the WTO's autocratic procedures, Nader proclaimed that the
U.S. Government influenced by industry "is using GATT and NAFTA to ...
subordinate our Democratic processes." Inside Politics Extra (CNN television
broadcast, Apr. 9, 1996); see also Norman Ornstein,Elite Men of the People, THE
WKLY. STANDARD, Mar. 18, 1996, at 16 (quoting Nader as saying that joining
the WTO involves "replacing democratic powers residing in the U.S. govern-
ment with the autocratic authority of a world government"). See generally
Ralph Nader & Lori Wallach, GA 7T, NAFTA, and the Subversion of the Demo-
cratic Process, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 92, 92-107 (Jerry
Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds., 1996) (discussing the "undemocratic man-
ner in which [GATT and NAFTA] were created, sold, and passed and, should
they continue to exist, their crushing effects on worldwide democracy").
See Letter from Ralph Nader to Vice President Gore (May 21, 1997)
< http://www.citizen.org/rnlet2.htm > (criticizing the Clinton administration
for caving in to WTO environmental demands, leading to the "evisceration of
Congress' effectiveness in many policy areas"); see also GA T Rule On U.S.
Tuna Ban Threatens Environmental Law, Oct. 7, 1991, LDC DEBT REP. 8 (citing
Nader as saying that the WTO will precipitate a global downward spiral of en-
vironmental protection laws).
Representatives of Nader's organization, Public Citizen, have also been vo-
ciferous in expressing their concern that the WTO imperils environmental law.
See, e.g., Trade Implications of Congressional Action on U.S. Dolphin Protection
Laws: Hearings on H.R. 2823 and H.R. 2856 Before Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wild-life, and Oceans of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong. (1996)
[hereinafter Hearings] (including testimony of Lori Wallach, Director, Public
Citizen s Global Trade Watch, stating that 
the WTO threatens a number of
domestic environmental laws); Nancy Dunne, Environment Rules Set Stage for
GA77Conflicts, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1991, at 6 (discussing Public Citizen's view
that the trade regime compromises nations' sovereignty to set and enforce
health, safety, an environmental laws). Public Citizen and a number of other
organizations placed full-page ads in major newspapers claiming that the WTO
was going to "SABOTAGE! ... America's Health, Food Safety, and Environ-
mental Laws." C. Ford Runge, FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT 1
(1994).
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While Nader, like those who limit their advocacy to envi-
ronmental concerns, has not worked out a comprehensive pro-
gram calling for the unilateral banning of goods made in ways
that the United States would consider unnecessarily damaging to
the environment, his ad hoc calls for such bans are consistent
enough to lead to the popular impression of a programmatic solu-
tion. While recognizing Nader's criticisms as valid, I do not be-
lieve that it would be wise to eliminate the WTO or to unilater-
ally ban foreign products in an attempt to influence offshore
environmental policy.
Unlike Nader, I regard the creation of the WTO as essentially
a positive development. In many respects we are creating, for the
first time in history, a global civilization. Changes in communi-
cation and transportation technologies, having already undergone
a dramatic revolution in this century, now allow for the type of
sustained interactions between people around the globe that were
impossible little more than a decade ago.1 Not only have these
8 See Letter from Lori Wallach and Ralph Nader to Mickey Kantor, Aug.
3, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, National Desk Section; Prepared
Testimony of Ralph Nader on the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade: Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science anzd Transpor-
tation (1994); Peter Eisler, Using Trade to Improve Environment May Backfire,
GANNET NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 1, 1991; see also Peter Behr, Clinton to Launch
Major Drive to Win Passage of GA TT Pact, WASH. POST, May 3, 1994, at D1.
9 There is a more fundamentalist critique of international trade than that
provided by Nader. Some"deep" environmentalists believe that large scale so-
cial organizations as well as industrial organizations are inherently environmen-
tally destructive and dehumanizing. There is a long and rich tradition of such
thinking. In fact, there are many traditions taking many forms which, in dif-
ferent ways, have embodied this belief. Some examples are the Luddites smash-
ing machines, Ghandi's small collectives, the Amish rejection of 20th century
technology, and the self-sufficiency communitarian movement of the sixties.
For one extremely influential mid-century expression of this philosophy, see
E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE
MATTERED (1973). Many of the environmentalists who are heirs to this tradi-
tion today believe that trade-based economies that find their most extreme ex-
pression in international trade are in themselves destructive of human values
and should not be encouraged. This Article does not address this more funda-
mentalist perspective. Accordingly those who adhere to that viewpoint are
likely to find this Article irrelevant to their concerns.
0 "Historically, human activities have been structured by contiguity. The
basic social, political, and economic units were villages or towns, aggregated
into provinces, nations, and regions. Telecommunications and air transport are
changing that." ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES WITHOUT
BOUNDARIES 65 (1990). Technological developments in communications, es-
pecially those which are more active (e-mail, the world wide web, etc.) rather
than passive (traditional mass media such as radio and television), make true
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changes in technology allowed for international trade to grow
dramatically, but they have also permitted the very process of
production to become globally integrated." These technological
global interaction possible. See id. at 240. See generally RICHARD J. BARNET &
JOHN CAVANAGH, GLOBAL DREAMS: IMPERIAL CORPORATIONS AND THE
NEW WORLD ORDER 2541 (1994) (explaining that, as a result of travel and
mass media, what were once unique national cultures have taken on a global
dimension).
In recent decades, there has been a statistically demonstrable correlation be-
tween the level of telecommunications infrastructure and Gross National Prod-
uct ("GNP") or Gross Domestic Product ("GDP"). See ROBERT J. SAUNDERS
ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 4-7 (1994). For
the historical development of communications technologies and their impact
on the international order, see HOWARD H. FREDERICK, GLOBAL COM-
MUNICATIONS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1993). See also ARTHUR C.
CLARKE, How THE WORLD WAS ONE: BEYOND THE GLOBAL VILLAGE (1992)
(discussing the development of telecommunications from the telegraph to satel-
lites and fiberoptics). For a discussion of the role and impact of the computer
revolution on the economy, see DON TAPSCOTT, THE DIGITAL ECONOMY:
PROMISE AND PERIL IN THE AGE OF NETWORKED INTELLIGENCE 187-188
(1996).
While landmark developments in transportation technology have occurred
more gradually than those in communications, they have nevertheless been of
great significance in the overall movement toward globalization. With the de-
velopment and widespread use of jet aircraft, it became feasible, both in terms
of economics and time, for large numbers of people to take international trips.
See T.A. HEPPENHEIMER, TURBULENT SKIES, THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL
AVIATION 304 (1995). See $enerally GEOFFREY KNIGHT, CONCORDE: THE
INSIDE STORY (1976) (discussing the development and impact of the creation of
supersonic air travel). In addition, recent developments in high speed rail sys-
tems have increased the efficiency of international land-based transport. See
MITCHELL P. STROHL, EUROPE'S HIGH SPEED TRAINS: A STUDY IN GEO-
ECONOMICS (1993).
" Commercial entities increasingly have the ability to structure their
manufacturing or production processes in the most economically efficient
manner. Through decreased logistical barriers and transfers of technology,
multinational corporations are able to create global production facilities. See
BARNET & CAVANAGH, supra note 10, at 273-82; JOHN H. DUNNING,
MULTINATIONALS, TECHNOLOGY AND COMPETITIVENESS (1988). For an ex-
ample of the advantages of international technology transfers, see Tetsuo Abo,
Japanese Motor Vehicfe Technologies Abroad in the 1980s, in THE TRANSFER OF
INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY 167-90 (David J. Jeremy ed., 1992) (discussing
the exportation of Japanese automobile manufacturing processes and the inter-
national exchange of industrial technology). See also ROBERT GILPIN, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 251 (1987) (discussing
the benefits to developing countries).
Technological developments allow for "intellectual capital" to become a
global commodity. Through the use of satellites, fiberoptics, and other develop-
ing telecommunication technologies, multinational corporations can efficiently
manage their operations. See MARSHALL MCLUHAN & BRUCE R. POWERS,
THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: TRANSFORMATIONS IN WORLD LIFE AND MEDIA IN
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developments have additionally helped spur the largest migrations
of peoples between societies in history. 2 Complementing all of
these changes, the world's people are increasingly receiving the
same news, watching the same movies, reading the same books,
and organizing their social relationships in similar ways. 3 This
emerging global civilization requires global regulation. In many
areas in need of regulation (for example, deciding which human
activity threatens the environment), a global scale is now neces-
sary to effectively deal with the problems domestic regulation was
originally designed to ameliorate.' 4  Given this need for global
regulation, if we wish to have a just, open, and peaceful interna-
tional order, global regulatory regimes adapted from domestic
democratic systems must be implemented.
THE 21ST CENTURY 89-91 (1989); ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS
110-18, 136-53 (1991) (analyzing the increasing globalization in design, produc-
tion of components, assembly, and marketing by multinational corporations
and the erosion of the national identity of today's corporations); WALTER B.
WRISTON, THE TWILIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY 4041 (1992) (discussing how
software engineers in the Philippines develop programs for the "Big Six" ac-
counting firms and transmit the programs back to the U.S. via satellite).12•
Over the course of the last decade, there has been a resurgence in the mi-
gration of individuals leaving developing countries for more industrialized na-
tions. See STEPHEN CASTLES & MARK J. MILLER, THE AGE OF MIGRATION:
INTERNATIONAL POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN THE MODERN WORLD 65, 80
(1993); see also PETER STALKER, THE WORK OF STRANGERS: A SURVEY OF
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION 5, 253, 275-82 (1994) (chronicling the
social and political aspects of migration and providing quantitative case studies
of several key nations. For an example of how immigration to one industrial-
ized nation has soared in the last two decades, see VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR.,
MASS IMMIGRATION AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST (1992).
13 As new forms of communicative media emerge, the people of the world
become more accessible to one another and begin to share information and cul-
ture in a manner that was once only possible in one's local community. See DE
SOLA POOL, supra note 10, at 65-99. As a result of the widespread and instan-
taneous availability of information, individuals identify with, if not develop a
kinship with, like-minded individuals within the global community. See
WRISTON, supra note 11, at 46-61; see also FREDERICK, supra note 10, at 272-75
(discussing the increase of cultural exchanges as a result of technological innova-
t an articulating concerns that this can lead to cultural imperialism).
Through international marketing and exports by major corporations, individu-
als around the globe are attempting to "buy into" a uniform culture and life-
style. See BARNET & CAVANAGH, supra note 10, at 42-67 (discussing the
globalization of the corporate world, using Sony as an example).
14 See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L.
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In this Article, I will explain why the WTO is arguably the
most effective international regulatory institution thus created.
Although it has yet to offer any positive contribution to global
environmental protection, and while its procedures are not yet
transparent and open, I will demonstrate the WTO's potential to
be an effective forum for the creation and enforcement of harmo-
nized international standards relating to process production
methods ("PPMs"). 5 Such PPMs could be effectively employed
in such areas as clean air, clean water, hazardous waste, occupa-
tional health and safety, and national resource preservation.
In order to lay the groundwork for my argument against the
environmental isolationist approach, in Section 2, I will describe
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and the
WTO. I will then briefly discuss the origins and history of inter-
national environmental law. Section 2 will conclude with an ex-
planation of why the domain of international trade regulation has
come to overlap with that of international environmental regula-
tion. To explain why the WTO should become a forum for
global environmental regulation, Section 3 will focus on the spe-
cific relationship between the WTO and the environment. I will
also explain why some free trade advocates believe that the WTO
should not involve itself with environmental regulation, and why
I believe they are mistaken.
Section 4 of the Article will explain why a unilateral approach
to compelling global environmental protection is ill-advised. Fi-
nally, Section 5 will explain the benefits of bringing both the en-
forcement and negotiation of global environmental agreements
within the ambit of the WTO.
15 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") defines process production methods ("PPMs") as standards that spec-
ify how a product is manufactured, harvested, or taken. They encompass emis-
sion and effluent standards, certain performance or operations standards, and
practices prescribed for natural resource sectors. Terms such as "made with,"
"produced by," and "harvested by" signify a PPM standard. All PPM standards
apply to the production stage, such as the time period before a product isplaced
on the market for sale. These standards speciy criteria for How a product is
produced or processed. The PPM standard may also address the environmental
effects of a product throughout its life-cycle such as the effects which may
emerge when the product is produced, transported, consumed or used, and dis-
posed of. See Typology of Trade Measures Based on Environmental Product
Standards and PPM Standards: Note by the Secretariat, Joint Session of Trade
and Environment Experts, OECD Environment Directorate and Trade Direc-
torate, COM/ENV/TD (93) 89 (Sept. 28-30, 1993).
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None of this Article's prescriptions should be taken as dogma.
My arguments are essentially tactical. It may be that there are
rare instances when unilateral action by the United States to en-
force global environmental standards is necessary. There may
also be times when the WTO is not the best multilateral structure
to negotiate, and later to govern, international environmental
agreements. Obviously, we live in an extremely fluid political
climate. As events unfold, there may be alternative forums that
would better allow agreements to be reached. Yet, enforcement
could still be sought within the framework of the WTO. There
may be times when only coordination with the WTO is called
for; there may even be times when it is best to circumvent the
Organization altogether. I write at a very high level of generality,
for the purpose of presenting (1) the implications of the prefer-
ence for unilateral approaches to solving global environmental
problems to which some environmentalists seem partial, and (2)
the overall advantages that can be achieved within the WTO.
2. THE FRAMEWORK: THE GATT, THE WTO, AND THE
POROUS BOUNDARIES SEPARATING TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
2.1. The History and Function of the GA Tr and the WTO
The sixty-four year time-line leading to the establishment of
the WTO began with Conressional passage of the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act in 1930.1 Smoot-Hawley dramatically in-
creased United States tariffs on foreign goods, triggering retalia-
tory tariff increases by other countries. In the eyes of American
and British post-war planners, these increases caused a contraction
in international trade, greatly exacerbating the depression of the
1930s.' 7 They saw the resulting economic turmoil, particularly in
Germany, as a major contributing cause of the Second World
War.'8 In their attempts to learn the lessons of history, the post-
16 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590
(1930.(1 See JOHN JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT 1-57
(1969).
18 In 1930, the United States Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff
Act, which set tariffs on many items in excess of 50%. See ESTY, supra note 1,
at 243-44; MICHAEL LUsZTIG, RISKING FREE TRADE: THE POLITICS OF FREE
TRADE IN BRITAIN, CANADA, MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES 51, 53, 60
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war planners ultimately succeeded in establishing a global trade• 19 • -20
regime. 9 This regime, the GATT, was designed to discourage
governments from pursuing policies which placed imports from
foreign countries at a disadvantage relative either to domestically
produced goods or goods produced in other foreign countries.
21
The primary rules promoting this objective were the follow-
ing: (1) Article I, the "Most Favored Nation" provision which
required that countries not discriminate in trading between for-
eign nations; (2) Article III, the "National Treatment" provision,
which required that countries not discriminate against foreign
(1996). The measure was purportedly aimed at protecting United States jobs in
the recessionary economy, but prompted other nations to enact retaliatory pro-
tectionist measures. See id. at 53. These protectionist measures succeeded in
choking off international trade. See LUSZTIG, supra at 53; PETER TEMiN,
LESSONS FROM THE GREAT DEPRESSION 81 (1989); Bartram S. Brown, Devel-
oping Countries in the International Trade Order, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 347
(1994). Economies world-wide were affected; among the most severely affected
were the United States and Germany. See John Linarelli, Peace Building, 24
DENV. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 253 (1996). The economic crisis in Germany cre-
ated a window of opportunity for the Nazi's rise topower, and the "decline of
the political moderates in Japan" precipitating World War II. Id. at 266. Les-
sons learned from protectionist measures of the 1930's were a major impetus in
the post-war development of the GATT, International Monetai Fund
("IME"), and World Bank. See id at 267; TEMIN, supra at 46; Louis B. Sohn,
Uruguay Round, 28 INT'L LAW. 565, 567 (1994); Richard B. Stewart, Environ-
mental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039 (1993).
19 See NIGEL GRIMWADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: NEW PATTERNS OF
TRADE, PRODUCTION AND INVESTMENT 30 (1989) (documenting both the
motivation behind the adoption of the GATT and the act that "[t]he most im-
portant vehicle of increasea economic integration after the Second World War
was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade").
20 The GATT was only one of the three so-called "Bretton Woods" institu-
tions, which were designed to play a complementary role in promoting a liberal
international economic order. The other two were the IMF and the World
Bank. The IM was created to ensure the liquidity necessary for international
trade and to avoid the types of competitive devaluations that, alon with tariff
increases in the 1930s, had been the instruments of trade wars. -The World
Bank was intended to provide the capital necessary for rebuilding war-torn
Europe. See generally David Vines, The WTO in Relation to the Fund and the
Bank, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 59, 63-67 (1998)
(focusing specifically on the inter-relationship between the WTO and the
World Bank, and the IMF).
21 See Marsha A. Echols, Sanitary and Phytosanitay Measures, in THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 191 (Terrence P.
Stewart ed., 1996); David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to In-
ternational Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 19
(1995); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organiza-
tions, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 398, 432-33 (1997).
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importers in establishing or applying domestic regulations; and (3)
Article XI which prohibited (subject to exceptions) the use of
quantitative restrictions, such as quotas, on the import of foreign
goods.
22
The post-war planners only intended that the GATT provide
substantive trade rules. They did not intend for it to endure as an
international organization. An institutional structure was to be
created in a separate treaty establishing what was to be called the
International Trade Organization ("ITO"). As a result of opposi-
tion within the United States Congress, however, this agreement
never came into being23 and the GATT was left to assume, by de-
fault, the administrative burdens created by the growth of inter-
national trade. Rising to this challenge, the GATT took on the
responsibilities of an international organization. 24 Acting in this
capacity, over the years, it sponsored a series of multilateral nego-
tiations which succeeded in virtually eliminating tariffs on manu-
factured goods. 25 Under the GATT, international trade has in-
creased dramatically during the last half century.26
By 1986 most of the countries in the world had signed the
GATT and had become members of the Organization. That year,
in Punta del Este, Uruguay, these members initiated the most
22 See General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947]. See generally Rex J. Zedalis, A
Theory of the GA7T "Like" Product Common Language Cases, 27 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1994) (discussing extensively the obligations of GATT and
the relevant exceptions).
23 For a detailed history of the efforts to develop the International Trade
Organization ("ITO"), see JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
27-34 (1989) (noting that "the principal reason" for the ITO not being realized
was the "failure of the United States Congress to approve it"). See also Stephen
Zamora, Voting in International Economic Organizations, 74 ARIZ. J. INT'L L.
566, 579 (1980) ("The ill-fated International Trade Organization... succumbed
to the refusal of the United States and other Western powers to subject national
trade policies to the control of an organization whose voting structure was not
weihted in their favor....').
4 See KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970); Zamora, supra note 23, at 579 ("[The]
GATT did survive to become a unique international economic organization.").
25 Successive rounds of negotiation have reduced the average tariffs on
goods imported by industrialized countries from around 40% to below 4%. The
number of signatory countries to the GATT has risen from 23 to 133 and now
represents over 80% of world trade in goods. See David M. Gould & William
C. Gruben, WillFair Trade Diminish Free Trade?,Bus. ECON., Apr. 1997, at7.
26 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
STATISTICS YEARBOOK 787 (1993).
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ambitious round of trade negotiations ever undertaken. In 1994,
after eight years of discussion, the Uruguay Round finally came to
an end with the establishment of the WTO, a dejure international
trade organization.2 7  Today, the WTO administers the trading
rules established by the GATT, as well as several other trade re-
lated agreements, that resulted from the Uruguay Round. These
include agreements related to trade in services and the protection
of intellectual property.
28
2.2. Emergence and Scope of International Environmental Law
The early 1970s saw the emergence of, or what appeared to be
at the time, the distinct area of international environmental law.
The seminal event was the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment. In addition to catalyzing the international
environmental movement, the Stockholm Conference succeeded
in articulating a statement of fundamental international environ-
mental principles known as the Stockholm Declaration, 29 and in
serving as the impetus for the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme ("UNEP") .30 In the ensuing years, multilateral environ-
27 The negotiations for the Uruguay Round began in 1986, and concluded
in 1993. The signing of the final agreement took place in Marrakesh, on April
15, 1994. See Final Act Embodying the Results of-the Uruguay Round of Mul-
tilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final
Act]; see also JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT 3
(1994) (reviewing the results of the Uruguay Round).
28 The WTO is a multilateral organization which administers the GATT,
the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"), the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT"), as well as a number of other trade-related
agreements. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
29 See Ben Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development: The
Roles of National, State, and Local Governments in Translating Grand Strategy
into Action, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 307, 308 (1995) ("The Stockholm Declara-
tion is often pointed to as the progenitor of modern environmental law."). The
1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment established the
United Nations Environment Programme ("UNEP"). See Shireen Irani Bacon,
Note, Up In Smoke: The Need for International Regulation of Hazardous Waste
Incineration, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 257, 277 (1994) ("[The Stockholm] Conference
resulted in a declaration on the human environment (Stockholm Declaration),
which 'marked the emergence of international environmental law as a separate
branch of international law.'") (citation omitted).
30 Since its formation, UNEP has played a prominent role in the develop-
ment of multilateral environmental agreements. See Daniel C. K. Chow, Rec-
ognizing the Environmental Costs of the Recognition Problem: The Advantages of
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mental a~reements ("MEAs") were promulgated in a wide variety
of areas, including the protection of plant and animal species,
the climate,33 and waste disposal.34
2.3. The Overlap Between Trade and Environmental
Regulation
As I will explain shortly, powerful state and commercial in-
terests are committed to the ideological proposition that the re-
gime that regulates international trade should not concern itself
with the environment. Such ideology notwithstanding, the
regulatory spheres governed by international trade law and inter-
national environmental law have increasingly come to converge.
36
Taiwan's Direct Participation in International Environmental Law Treaties, 14
STAN. ENvTL. LJ. 256, 276 (1995) (noting that "the UNEP has successfully
hosted negotiations of nearly thirty multilateral treaties").
31 For a concise history of international environmental agreements with a
discussion of some key agreements, see Edith Brown Weiss,International Envi-
ronmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order,
81 GEO. L.J. 675 (1993). See generally GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Phillipe Sands ed., 1994) (providing a detailed examination of the historical de-
velopment and treatment of environmental problems by the international legal
committee).32
See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development:
Convention on Biological Diversity, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818, 823 (1992)
[hereinafter Convention on Biological Diversity]; Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T.
1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter Endangered Species Convention].
33 See Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 38 (1992)
[hereinafter Climate Change Convention]; Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 10 (1987).
34 See United Nations Environment Programme Conference of Plenipoten-
tiaries on the Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes: Final Act and Text of Basel Convention, Mar. 22,
1989, S. Treaty Doc. No. 5 [hereinafter Basel Convention]; Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, en-
tered into force Aug. 30, 1975, 1046 U.N.T.S. 138 [hereinafter Marine Pollution
Convention].
35 See infra Section 3.1.
36 An acknowledgement of this linkage was the basis for the WTO's crea-
tion of the Committee on Trade and the Environment ("CTE"). The CTE was
established and its work program set at the Uruguay Round. See Trade and
Environment, TN.TNC/MIN(94)/1/REV (Apr. 14, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1267
(1994). For a review of some of the major works of the Committee, see Report
of the WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment, PRESS/TE/014 (Nov.
18, 1996) [hereinafter Report on Trade and the Environment] (discussing eco-
labeling, the relationship between multilateral environmental agreements
[Vol 19:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss3/3
THE WTO AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The first reason for this convergence has been the increasing use
of trade restrictive measures in MEAs. For example, the Conven-
tion on the International Trade in Endangered Species37 requires
signatories to prohibit imortation of certain species that are
threatened with extinction. This presents a potential conflict
("MEAs") and the WTO, and non-product, environmental PPMs). For a dis-
cussion of the convergence between trade and the environment as it relates to
NAFTA, see David S. Baron, NAFTA and the Environment-Making the Side
Agreement Work, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 603 (1995) (discussing the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation).
There has been a significant amount of commentary on the linking of trade
and environmental issues in recent years. See, e.g., CENTER FOR INTER-
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1993) (containing a collection of essays by noted
trade experts and environmentalists). The GTE and the European Commission
recently published a report on the conflict between international trade and in-t rnational environmental law. S e Chronological Summary: Internation l Trea
ties and Agreements, 7 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 417 (1996).
37 Endgr Species Convention, supra note 32. For a discussion of thetade implications of the Basel Convention, see Shannon Hu nall, T wards a
Greener International Trade System: Multilateral Environmental Agreements and
the World Trade Organization, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 175, 193-209
(1996). See also Basel Convention, supra note 34, at 662-63. Several other major
environmental treaties also specifically provide for the use of trade restrictions
to accomplish the goals of the treaty. Protocol on Substances That Deplete the
Ozone Layer, supra note 33, at 1552-54. Additionally, two recent treaties, the
Biological Diversity Convention and the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion, incorporate or envision the use of trade measures. See Climate Change
Convention, supra note 33, at 854-55; Chris Wold, Multilateral Environmental
Agreements and the GA7: Conflict and Resolution?, 26 ENVTL. L. 841, 844
(1996) (discussing the Biological Diversity Convention). Other environmental
agreements utilize trade restrictions. See, e.g., Convention for the Prohibition
of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific and Its Protocols, Nov. 24,
1989, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1449, 1454-63 (1990); Association of South East
Asian Nations Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Re-
sources, reprinted in 15 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 64 (1985); International Code of
Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides, 23 fao/conf/res10/85 (Nov.
28, 1985); Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, 27
U.S.T. 3918, T.I.A.S. No. 8409.
' This conflict is not limited to the Endangered Species Convention.
Generally speaking, WTO members who become parties to environmental
agreements with trade restricting provisions potentially face conflicting obliga-
tions. See PATRICK LOW, TRADING FREE: THE GATTj AND U.S. TRADE
POLICY (1993); Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging
the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L Lj. 459, 491-92 (1994). Where enforcement of
an MEA results in trade restrictions against a member of the WTO that is not a
party to the MEA, the potential for conflict is exacerbated. See Thomas E. Skil-
ton, Note, GA 7T and the Environment in Conflict: The Tuna-Dolphin Dispute
and the Quest for an International Conservation Strategy, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
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between GATT rules (guaranteeing free trade) and environmental
rules (promoting species survival).
The second reason for this convergence has been the tendency
of some countries to resort to unilateral trade restrictions in order
to remedy what they perceive to be extrajurisdictional environ-
mental infractions.3 ' The best known examples of this have been
American attempts to restrict the import of foreign tuna that are
caught outside of U.S. territorial waters in ways that kill large
numbers of dolphins,40 and of shrimp caught outside of U.S. wa-
ters in ways that kill a large number of endangered sea turtles.
41
Such unilateral attempts to promote global environmental norms
come into conflict with GATT-based provisions designed to en-
455, 478-81 (1993). See generally Hudnall, supra note 37, at 175 (recognizing a
reconcilable conflict between environment and trade objections).
Several environmental agreements contain provisions permitting or requir-
ing the use of trade restrictive measures against those not in compliance with
the agreement. See, e.g., Endangered Species Convention, supra note 32; Proto-
col on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layersupra note 33; Basel Conven-
tion, supra note 34.
NAFTA provides generally that NAFTA obligations will be subordinated
to inconsistent obligations of several key environmental agreements in the
event of a conflict. See Joseph G. Block & Andrew R. Herrup, The Environ-
mental Aspects of NAFTA and Their Relevance to Possible Free Trade Agreements
Between the United States and Caribbean Nations, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 25
(1994). However, the Convention on Biodiversity may conflict with NAFTA.
See Robert W. Benson, Free Trade as an Extremist Ideology: The Case of NAFTA,
17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 555, 565-66 (1994). See generally Kurt C. Hof-
gard, Is This Land Really Our Land?: Impacts of Free Trade Agreements on U.S.
Environmental Protection, 23 ENVTL. L. 635 (1993) (discussing GATT and
NAFTA); Stephen L. Kass, Recent Developments in International Environ-
mental Law, ENVTL. L. UPDATE, 1993, at 847 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac.
Course Handbook Series No. 474, 1993).
39 See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
40 This restriction was challenged within the WTO dispute resolution sys-
tem and resulted in the first two WTO panel decisions dealing with whether
states can unilaterally restrict trade to protect offshore environmental re-
sources. See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restric-
tions on Imports of Tuna, D/S1/R (Aug. 16, 1991) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin
I]; GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on
Tuna, D/S1/R Gune 1994) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin II]. For a more detailed
discussion of the GATT rules as applied in the Tuna-Dolphin decisions, seein-
fra note 50 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the WTO dispute reso-
lution system, see infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
41 See GATT: Dispute Panel Report on U.S. Complaint Concerning Im-
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sure that foreign "products"42 are allowed access to domestic mar-
kets.
This creation of both international and domestic environ-
mental law that impacts international trade is based on an increas-
ing understanding of the profound link that exists between global
trade and the global environment. The extent to which this link
justifies giving the WTO a role in environmental regulation is the
topic to which we will now turn.
3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT
3.1. The Case for Environmental Sovereignty
In order to understand the environmentalist criticism of the
WTO, some knowledge of the WTO's historic position on the
link between trade and the environment is necessary. Many of
the industry and developing country supporters of free trade ar-
gue that the WTO should respect and even protect what I will call
the "environmental sovereignty" of its members. They claim that
in fulfilling its mandate to promote free trade, the Organization
should not interfere or allow interference with what they'con-
sider to be the entirely domestic concern of deciding the appro-
priate level of local environmental protection. 43 Poorer countries
42 The use of the word "product" in GATT parlance refers to manufac-
tured and natural goods as welI as to non-human species of beings that are killed
and used for commercial purposes. Such beings should not be considered prod-
ucts because they are not produced, i.e., "manufactured." See MERRIAM-
WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1974). I explain this term be-
cause I believe that such unfeeling use of language ensures us of the vitality of
the living world, and this, of course, has everything to do with global environ-
mentalism.
" Many developing country members of the WTO see attempts by devel-
oped country members to use trade measures to force them to change their
domestic environmental standards as an infringement of their sovereignty. See
Andrea C. Durbin, Trade and the Environment: The North-South Divide, 37
ENV'T 16 (1995); see also Robert L. McGeorge, The Pollution Haven Problem in
International Law: Can the International Community Harmonize Liberal Trade,
Environmental and Economic Development Policies?, 12 WIS. INT'L L.J. 277, 280
(1994) (discussing the concern of less developed countries ("LDCs") over"eco-
imperialism"); Protectionism: The Modern Face of Imperialism, SWISS REVIEW OF
WORLD AFFAIRS, May 2, 1996 (arguing that developing nations' concerns that
impediments to free-trade have the potential to bring about eco-imperialism"
are not entirely unfounded).
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they claim, for example, might well wish to tolerate higher levels
of environmental degradation in exchange for certain economic
benefits and should be left free to do so. This is an application of
the still dominant view of state sovereignty,44 which asserts that
states should be left free to regulate all matters of human activity
within their territories.
45
Indonesia is an example of a country that has taken a particularly strong
position in support of maintaining the WTO's adherence to "environmenta
sovereignty." See Bhimanto Suwastoyo, Jakarta Tells WTO to Heed the Needs of
Developing Countries, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Sept. 4, 1996 (quoting Indonesian
Foreign Minister Alatas who stated that "WTO member countries should not
impose inappropriate environmental standards on their fellow members and
should not use trade measures for the protection of the environment").
44 For international law purposes a state is defined as "[a]n entity that has a
defined territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own
government, and that engages in or -as the capacity to engage in, formal rela-
tions with other such entities." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987). Under the traditional notion
of state sovereignty, the state's authority within its territory is nearly unquali-
fied. This understanding of state sovereignty is reflected in Justice Marshall's
famous observation:
The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily
exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation, not imposed
by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external-
source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty, to the extent, of the
restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in
that power which could impose such restriction. All exceptions,
therefore, to the full and complete power of anation within its own
territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself.
The Schooner Exch. v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116, 135 (1812) (emphasis added).
The concept of state sovereignty today has become far more nuanced. Particu-
larly in the area of human rights, limitations are placed on state sovereignty.
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945,
59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472. For a more expansive discussion on sovereignty,
see CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM, HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF SOVER-
EIGNTY SINCE ROUSSEAU (1900); PETER N. RIESENBERG, THE INAL-
IENABILITY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT (1956). See
also M.N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 41, 42 (1991) (discussing state sover-
eignty generally).
4 Cyrille De Klemm and Clare Shine apply the concept of state sover-
eignty to the environment:
The most fundamental rule in international relations is that States are
sovereign entities and that, subject to international law, they may con-
duct their business as they please. States exercise sovereign rights over
all natural resources on their territory, which means that they may
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The GATT's articles, as interpreted by the WTO's dispute
resolution panels and appellate body, work to protect the thus de-
scribed "environmental sovereignty" of its members. To start, the
Organization refrains from interfering with the environmental
sovereignty of member states. Nothing in the WTO Agreement
provides for the imposition of substantive environmental stan-
dards on countries, and the Organization does not presently at-
tempt to do this.46 The WTO even more assertively promotes
conserve, exploit or destroy them, or allow them to be destroyed as
they wish.
CYRILLE DE KLEMM & CLARE SHINE, BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: CONSER-
VATION AND THE LAW 1 (1993); see also WERNER LEVI, CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 263 (1991) (stating that traditional notions of sover-
eignty are a major complication in the imp ementation of effective, global envi-
ronmental solutions).
The concept of sovereignty is embodied in what is perhaps international
environmental law's most f6undational document, the Stockholm Declaration.
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration states the following:
States have in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the Principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or con-
trol do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Principle 21, Stockholm, Sweden, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc.A/Conf.
48/14/Rev.1 (1973), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 [herinafter Stockholm Declara-
tion]. For further discussion of the Stockholm Declaration, seesupra note 29
and accompanying text.
46 With the exception of the vague preamble to the Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, neither the GATT nor the WTO has been in-
volved in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement for the protection of the
environment. See David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to In-
ternational Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 31
(1995). Some commentators, however, have characterized the TBT and the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures as envi-
ronmental agreements. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, in
WTO Agreement, Annex 1A [hefinafter TBT Agreement]; Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, in WTO Agreement, An-
nex 1A [herinafter SPS Agreement]; Christine M. Cuccia, Note, Protecting
Animals in the Name of Biodiversity: Effects of the Uruguay Round of Measures
Regulating Methods of Harvesting, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 481 (1995); see also Richard
H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO:
Regional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (1997)
(discussing WTO's limited environmental mandate to the CTE and the Com-
mittees that administer the TBT and SPS). For a discussion of the role and
function of the SPS agreement, see infra note 51. The CTE specifically dis-
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environmental sovereignty by prohibiting member states from in-
fringing on the environmental sovereignty of other member
states. The authority to do this is found in decisions by WTO ad-
judicative bodies which hold that the GATT forbids states from
using trade restrictive measures to attempt to influence the envi-
ronmental standards of other countries.
Two provisions circumscribing the permissible scope of do-
mestic regulation are particularly important. Article Ill estab-
lishes what is called "the National Treatment" standard.47 Gener-
ally, this allows countries to require that foreign products
conform to domestic regulations as long as such regulations treat
foreign products no less favorably than like domestically pro-
duced goods. The other important provision, Article XX,4 al-
lows for GATT inconsistent measures (specifically, for the pur-
poses of this Article, to protect human, animal, or plant life or
health, or to conserve exhaustible natural resources) as long as
such measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate be-
tween countries where the same conditions prevail, or restrict in-
ternational trade.
49
cussed the role of MEAs within the WTO structure. See Report on Trade and
the Environment, supra note 36.
47 Article EI(4) requires the following:
[T]he products of the territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shal be accorded treat-
ment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national
origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting
their interna sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribu-
tion or use.
GATT 1947 art. Ell, para. 4.
48 Article XX, entitled General Exceptions, reads in relevant part as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures ... (b) necessary to protect hu-
man, animal or plant life or health ... (g) relating to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consump-
tion ....
GATT 1947 art. XX.
d Article XX's "necessary" protection requirement has been alternatively
defined by different WTO panels as the "least GATT inconsistent approach- or
as the "'least trade restrictive measure." See Steve Gharnovitz, The Environment
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The Organization's panels and appellate body have inter-
preted these two articles to mean that states can require environ-
mental health and safety standards for foreign manufactured im-
ports, but may not use trade measures in an attempt to impose
their own standards on the off-shore production processes used to
fabricate such products.
50
Thus, for example, (subject to what has become a major ex-
ception5 1) the United States may impose any limits on automobile
vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23 ENVTL. L. 475, 514 (1992). The "least
GATT inconsistent approach" or the "least trade restrictive" requirement pro-
vides for national environmental measures to be upheld under Article XX only
if no other reasonably available measure would have achieved the same envi-
ronmental goals with lesser burdens on trade. See Maury D. Shenk, United
States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603
(1996), 90 AM. J. INT'LL. 669, 672 (1996). Although no panel decision has ever
ruled a measure illegal based specifically on this provision, Article XX could
have a chilling effect as the requirement "can be very strict in practice, permit-
ting a tribunal to invalidate an environmental measure on the basis of often-
speculative judgments on the availability of less trade-restrictive alternatives."
Id.
50 See Janet McDonald, Greening the GA T. Harmonizing Free Trade and
Environmental Protection in the New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L. 397 (1992).
This distinction between the off-shore "process" of production and the impor-
tation of products for domestic consumption has become crucial to whether a
state's restriction is permissible under the exceptions of Article XX. See John
H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Con-
flict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227, 1242-43 (1992) (noting that "if a nation is
allowed to use the process characteristic as the basis for trade restrictive meas-
ures," there would be problematic consequences "that could open large loop-
holes in the GATT").
This distinction was in large part based on readings of the analysis devel-
oped in the Tuna-Dolphin opinions. See supra note 40 and accompanying text
(describing the circumstances leading to the Tuna-Dolphin decisions); RUNGE,
supra note 7, at 79-80 (1994) ("The [tuna-dolphin] panel reasoned that Article III
requires a comparison between products of the exporting and importing na-
tions, and not a comparison between different nations' production processes
that have no effect on the product qua product."); Ian Isaac Zreczny, The Proc-
ess/Product Distinction and the Tun/Dolphin Controversy: Greening the GA 7
Through InternationalAgreement, 1 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 79 (1994).
5' This exception is found in the SPS agreement. The agreement sets limits
on states' ability to restrict imports that are not in compliance with domestic
environmental standards, thereby undermining the claim that the WTO sup-
ports environmental sovereignty. Under the SPS Agreement, WTO member
states have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures that are
"necessary" for the protection of human and animal health. See SPS Agreement
art. 2:2. One of the requirements that must be fulfilled is that the measure must
be based on "scientific principles" and "sufficient scientific evidence." Id. Re-
cently, a WTO dispute resolution panel found a European Union regulation
banning (for health reasons) the domestic selling of beef that is hormone fed not
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emissions that it desires, as long as it does not establish more bur-
densome standards for imported cars than for domestic cars. It
may not, however, restrict the import of cars from foreign na-
tions based upon the amount of effluents that car factories inside
those countries are releasing into the air.
3.2. Responding to the Casefor Environmental Sovereignty
Environmentalists are justifiably critical of this approach.
The WTO's limited mission does not, in fact, leave each state free
to choose its own level of ecological welfare. This is so for several
reasons. We are increasingly coming to understand that the
whole of the earth's biosphere is ecologically interconnected and
that seemingly isolated damage to local environments has com-
plex and deleterious effects throughout the planetary system,
though these effects may be difficult to observe.. 2 Sometimes, so-
called domestic pollution can have quite obvious effects beyond
national borders. Those emissions from automobile assembly
plants in foreign nations contribute to global warming 53and may
to be based on scientific evidence. The WTO found the European Union in
violation of its treaty obligations despite the fact that the regulation banning
hormones was applied to domestic and foreign beef alike. See Report of the
1997 Panel on the EC, Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/0S26/R/USA (Aug 18, 1997). For further discussion of the SPS agreement
and its effect on the environment, see John J. Barcelo,Product Standards to Pro-
tect the Local Environment-the GA TT and the Uruguay Round Sanitary and
Phytosanitay Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 755, 769 (1994).
12 For a classic popular work which played a very important role in popu-
larizing the concept of ecological interconnection, see RACHAEL CARSON,
SILENT SPRING (1994). Vice President Albert Gore recently authored a book
that draws its inspiration from his understanding of global ecological intercon-
nectedness. ALBERT GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE
HUMAN SPIRIT (1993).
53 Certain airborne effluents (mainly halocarbons and carbon dioxide) trap
heat within the earth's atmosphere and are believed by the weight of scientific
authority to be raising the average global temperature. This may lead to very
deleterious results such as the raising of ocean levels (due to the melting of the
polar ice caps), possibly imperiling the earth's islands and coastal areas. Large
scale and potentially very damaging changes in the earth's weather patterns are
also anticipated. See COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND PUBLIC
POLICY, POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING: MITIGATION,
ADAPTATION AND THE SCIENCE BASE (1992); see also U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks:
1990-1994, EPA-230-R-96-006 ES1-6, at 91-99 (1995) (projecting greenhouse gas
emissions, correlating them to climate change, and discussing how the various
greenhouse gases interact with the atmosphere to alter the radiation balance).
The release of ozone destroying gases impacts regions far removed from the
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be a cause of air pollution and/or acid rain in neighboring coun-
tries.14 The danger to the earth's ozone layer is caused by chloro-
fluorocarbons ("CFCs') regardless of the country in which they
are produced or used.5 Deforestation, especially the destruction
of tropical rain forests, has obvious effects on the global climate,
56
source of emission. See Irwin N. Forseth, Plant Response to Multiple Environ-
mental Stresses: Implications for Climatic Change and Biodiversity, in BIODI-
VERSITY HI 187, 195 (Marjorie L. Reaka-Kudla et al.eds., 1997). For a compre-
hensive scientific discussion of the causes and resulting problems of global
warming, see A GLOBAL WARMING FORUM: SCIENTIFIC, ECONOMIC, AND
LEGAL OVERVIEW (Richard A. Geyer ed., 1993). For a non-technical overview
of global warming and contributing factors, see MICHAEL L. PARSONS,
GLOBAL WARMING, THE TRUTH BEHIND THE MYTH 9-15, 141-168, 213-229
(1995).
5' Acid rain forms when, as a result of the burning of fossil fuels, sulphur
and nitrogen compounds combine with atmospheric moisture. See GREGORY
S. WETSTONE & ARMIN ROSENCRANZ, ACID RAIN IN EUROPE AND NORTH
AMERICA: NATIONAL RESPONSES TO AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM (1983)
(providing an overview of the science and technology of acid rain and the laws
and policies governing control in the United States and internationally). For a
discussion of the progression of the acid rain problem with a focus on affected
regions in the United States and Canada, see Ross HOWARD & MICHAEL
PERLOY, ACID RAIN: THE DEVASTATING IMPACT ON NORTH AMERICA
(1982). For a collection of articles addressing issues related to transboundary air
pollution, see Bennett A. Caplan, Comment, The Applicability of Clean Air Act
Section 115 to Canada's Transboundary Acid Precipitation Problem, 11 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 539, 542-54 (1984) (identifying the causes and sources of
ecological and economic effects of the transnational acid precipitation problem
in North America).
'5 The layer acts to shield the Earth's inhabitants from harmful ultraviolet
radiation. See Daniel L. Albritton, Stratospheric Ozone Depletion: Global Proc-
esses, in OZONE DEPLETION, GREENHOUSE GASES, AND CLIMATE CHANGE 10
1989) (elaborating on the necessity of the ozone layer and the harm resulting
rom the release of chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs") into the atmosphere). Ozone
depletion is truly an issue of global consequence, as the danger to the earth's
ozone layer is not limited to areas above countries where ozone damaging
CFCs are released. See F. Sherwood Rowland, The Role of Halocarbons in
Stratospheric Ozone Depletion, OZONE DEPLETION, GREENHOUSE GASES, AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 33 (1989) ("Although about 95 percent [sic] of the chloro-
fluorocarbons (CFCs) are released in the Northern Hemisphere, the redistribu-
tion between the hemispheres is rapid enough that the Southern Hemisphere
lags behind the Northern by only about 10 percent [sic].");see also COMMITTEE
ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 53, at 377
(noting that chlorine from man-made sources in various countries contributed
to ozone loss above Antarctica).
56 Deforestation accounts for an estimated 20% of worldwide greenhouse
warming. See Rowland, supra note 55; Marlorie L. Reaka-Kudla, The Global
Biodiversity of Coral Reefs: A Comparison with Rain Forests, in BIODIVERITY H7,
supra note 53, at 86 (noting that "the potential effect of burning rain forests on
global climate" justifies the "international concern over biodiversity [being] fo-
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as well as on the planet's biological diversity. Intensifying these
global environmental problems, one of the main purposes of
WTO-supported free trade is to promote economic growth. Such
growth will result in increased industrial activity, and without
enhanced pollution controls, this will result in more degradation• 51
to the global environment.
There is another important reason that the WTO's promotion
of free trade does not leave each state free to choose its own level
of ecological welfare. By establishing the preconditions for free
trade, the Organization facilitates the unleashing of an environ-
mentally destructive global regulatory and economic dynamic
that is beyond the power of individual states to curtail.
cused on terrestrial environments, particularly the rapidly vanishing rain for-
ests"). Deforestation may reduce the eva portranspiration, resulting in decreased
precipitation with global ecological impications. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995 IMPACTS, ADAP-
TATIONS AND MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE: SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL
ANALYSES 113 (1996). Forests are a key factor in the determination of the
amount of carbon present in the eco-system. See id.
57 See Reaka-Kudla, supra note 56, at 86 (recognizing the importance of"how many species are present in these tropical wonderlands, the potential uses
of such genetic diversity ... and the shocking rates... at which these habitats
are being eclipsed by the activities of humans"). "Any degradation of tropical
forests, whether it is caused by climate or land-use changes, will lead to an irre-
versible loss of biodiversity." INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, supra note 56, at 95. Forests (primarily tropical) contain the majority
of the world's biodiversity. See id. at 99. "[E]very second more than an acre of
tropical rainforest vanishes. One plant or animal species becomes extinct every
fifteen minutes." Lynn Berat, Defending the Right to a Healthy Environment:
Toward a Crime of Geocide in International Law, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 327, 328
(1993). Approximately 1500 species become extinct each year as a result of the
destruction of tropical forests. See Paul Stanton Kibel, Reconstructing the Mar-
ketplace: The International Timber Trade and Forest Protection, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 735, 744 (1996) (citing the 1995 Report of the United Nations Secretary
General to the Commission on Sustainable Development, Prepared by the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 10) (on file with the Pacific
Environment and Resources Center).
58 Various commentators and environmentalists have noted the connection
between economic growth and environmental degradation. See Edward Gold-
smith, Global Trade and the Environment, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY, supra note 6, at 78, 78-91 (using Taiwan as an example to show that
.our environment is becoming ever less capable of sustaining the growing im-
pact of our economic activities"); Ralph Nader, Free Trade and the Decline of
Democracy, in THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE, supra note 3, at 1, 3; see alo
McGeorge, supra note 43, at 280 ("[F]ree trade can destroy the environment.")
(quoting Robert Schaeffer, Trading Away the Planet, 15 GREENPEACE, Sept.-
Oct. 1990, at 15).
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This is true because free trade furthers a so-called regulatory
"race to the bottom," whereby independent national regulato 7 g
regimes are all forced to lower their environmental standards. 9
In the contemporary world of relatively free trade, promoted by
the WTO, and open capital markets, 0 free-flowing capital gravi-
59 For leading articles discussing the "race to the bottom" as it applies to
environmental regulation, see Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Prob-
lems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental
Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977); Richard B. Stewart, The Development of
Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environ-
mental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IowA L. REV. 473
(1991).
For a discussion of the "race to the bottom" in the international context,
see Nader, supra note 58, at 6. While the "race to the bottom" is widely ac-
cepted, its existence has been debated in recent years. Professor Revesz has
written the leading article questioning the existence of a"race to the bottom" in
the area of environmental regulation. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating In-
terstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992) (questioning the ex-
istence of the "race to the bottom," based on theoretical as well as empirical
grounds).
For a response to Revesz's theory, see Esty, supra note 14, at 638
("[E]nvironmental policymakers remain justified in fearing the dynamic of a
regulatory race to the bottom."). Others have questioned the applicability of
the race to the bottom in environmental regulation. See Thomas J. Shoenbaum,
International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Searchfor
Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 293 (1997) (stating that the race to the
bottom in the area of international environmental regulation has been exagger-
ated). For a summary of the literature debating the existence of a regulatory
race to the bottom in the environmental context, see Kirsten H. Engel, State
Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a 'Race" and Is It "To the Bottom'?, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 271, 274-75 (1997).
60 Currently, such open capital markets are only, to a very limited extent,
guaranteed under the WTO's Trade Related Investment Measures Agreement.
See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTs OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M.
81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMS Agreement]. However, a large network of what
are called Bilateral Investment Treaties and Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-
tion Treaties largely ensure the continued existence of open capital markets.
For a comprehensive overview of Bilateral Investment Treaties, see Kenneth J.
Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 621 (1993). See also Shari-Ellen Bourque, Note, The Illegality of the Cu-
ban Embargo in the Current International System, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 191 (1995)
(defining and outlining the structure of Bilateral Investment Treaties).
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties "include a variety of agree-
ments that establish ground rules for the daily intercourse between countries."
Patricia McKinstry Robin, Comment, The Bit Won't Bite: The American Bilat-
eral Investment Treaty Program, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 931, 940 (1984). For further
discussion on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties, see Beth Ann Is-
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tates towards global export operations in those places where the
cost of meeting regulatory burdens are the lowest and profits are
the highest. In what has become a global regulatory market place,
states are forced to relax domestic environmental regulations
while attempting to out-bid each other to attract jobs and tax
revenues. A systematic reduction of global environmental stan-
dards is the result.
A second related concern is competitiveness. Within a global-
ized system of free trade, companies that operate in countries
with stricter environmental regulations will tend to be burdened
by higher production costs and will, therefore, have difficulty sell-
ing their goods at prices which are competitive with firms which
do not have to bear these costs. Therefore, even controlling for
free mobility of capital and disregarding the dynamic of the race
to the bottom, such firms will tend to be either driven out of
business or forced to devote their production resources to indus-
tries that are less environmentally problematic.
61
Some free trade apologists for the status quo justify this as a
beneficial environmental application of David Ricardo's famous
rationale for international trade, the law of comparative advan-
tage.62 According to Ricardo's theory,63 if trade barriers between
enberg, Note, The Evolving Conflict Between Employment Discrimination Laws
and Immunity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Article VIII of the FCN
Treaty Between the United States and Japan: the Papaila Case, 60 ALB. L. REV.
1441 (1997); Steven Pachman, Comment, Preventing the Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation Treaty 'rom Being Set at Naught': Allowing Subsidiaries to AssertForeign Parent's Treaty Rights, 69 TEMP. L. REv. 485 (1996).
SSee Robert F. Housman, The Treatment of Labor and Environmental Is-
sues in Future Western Hemishere Trade Liberalization Efforts, 10 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 301, 317 (1995) ( [W]hile environmental regulatory costs may be trivial
in some sectors, they can be substantial in those sectors that are most in need of
regulation because of their high impacts. In these high impact sectors, envi-
ronmental costs can be significant enough to effect investment and production
decisions."); see also Joseph R. Dancy, The Impact of the Clean Air Act's Ozone
Non-Attainment Areas on Texas: Ma or Problems and Suggested Solutions, 47 SMU
L. REV. 451, 453 (1994) (noting te inability of firms in countries with high
compliance costs to compete globally).
The theory of comparative advantage was developed by economist
David Ricardo at the turn of the eighteenth century. See 1 WORKS OF DAVID
RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 12841 (P. Strafa ed., 1975).
The theory generally states that if every country produces that which it can
produce most efficiently and engages in trade for other goods needed, overall
global production will be maximized. See RYAN C. AMACHER & HOLLEY H.
ULBRICH, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 62-64, 890-96 (1992).
63 See WORKS OF DAVID RICARDO, supra note 62, at 12841.
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nations are removed, each nation will come to produce what it
can produce most advantageously, and the greatest sum total of
world production will occur.64 Under the classic theory, a coun-
try gains a comparative advantage in producing certain goods if it
has access to factors of production which allow such goods to be
produced at a relatively lower cost than in other countries.6 ' For
example, a country may have a comparative advantage in growing
roses if soil and rainfall are conducive to rose production.
The argument that lax environmental standards should be
considered a way of gaining a comparative advantage rests on the
assumption that a preference for degrading the local environment
should be seen as a low cost factor of economic production. This
is a false assumption. The appearance of comparative advantage is
created because neither the producer who sells the product, nor
the consumer who buys it has to pay for the environmental costs
of the pollution. These costs are instead borne by those third par-
ties whose quality of life the pollution adversely effects.6 Because
the cost of pollution is not borne internally by the participants in
the market transaction, economists refer to it as an "externality."
Once environmental degradation is correctly understood to be an
externalized cost of production, it becomes clear that when that
64 See id. See generally Jackson, supra note 50, at 1243 (providing a contem-
porary overview of Ricardo's theory).
65 See WORKS OF DAVID RICARDO, supra note 62.
66 The developing countries' impoverished working classes suffer the most
immediate and devastating harm associated with environmental degradation.
See, e.g., Andrew Steer & Jocelyn Mason, The Role of Multilateral Finance and
the Environment: A View From the World Bank, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 35, 37-39 (1995) (citing WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 1992: DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 11(1992)); KEVIN M.
CLEAVER & GOTZ A. SCHREIBER, REVERSING THE SPIRAL: THE POPULATION
AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT NEXUS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (1994);
Edith Brown Weiss, Environmentally Sustainable Competitiveness: A Comment,
102 YALE L.J. 2123, 2127 (1993); see also James E. Beard, An Application of the
Principles of Sustainability to the Problem of Global Climate Change: An Argu-
ment for Integrated Energy Services, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 191 (1996) ("The
poor not only suffer disproportionately from environmental damage caused by
the better off, they have become a major cause of the ecological decline them-
selves."). For a discussion of environmental justice, see Bunyan Bryant, Meth-
odological Issues: Pollution Prevention and Participatory Research as a Methodology
for Environmental Justice, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 589 (1995). The principles of en-
vironmental justice are applicable on a global scale. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, From
Green to Global. Toward the Transformation of International Environmental
Law, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 292-3 (1995).
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cost is correctly attributed to the market cost of the products, the
advantage disappears.
Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers made the eco-
nomic argument for encouraging environmental degradation in
developing countries when he was the Chief Economist at the
World Bank.67 In an internal memorandum that ultimately be-
came public (generating considerable controversy), Summers ar-
gued that the World Bank should be encouraging migration of
"dirty" industries to developing countries.68 Part of his rationale
rested on the contention that "the demand for a clean environ-
ment for aesthetic and health reasons is likely to have very high
income-elasticity." 69 In other words, the demand for a clean envi-
ronment, like the demand for many other goods, is likely to in-
crease as people have more money. In a poor society, people
would be less likely to choose to utilize scarce resources to clean
up the environment. 70 This assumes that pollution is not a true
externality, but rather that the local population has collectively
chosen to bear this cost because of a perceived group benefit.
If there is such a benefit to the local population, however, it is
not clear what it is. While there may be some effect on local em-
ployment 7l or wages, determining whether this would be the case,
67 See Let Them Eat Pollution, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1992, at 66.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 This argument is frequently made by developing countries. They argue
that industrialized nations who advocate more stringent environmental stan-
dards fail to recognize the plight of the impoverished working classes. See De-
velopments in the Lau-International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1483, 1505 (1991) ("The Brazilian Delegate, at the historical Stockholm Confer-
ence, declared that 'his country had no interest whatever in the subject of pollu-
tion control' which he viewed as a 'rich man's problem.'") (quoting M.
ROYSTON, POLLUTION PREVENTION PAYS 3 (1979)). Many developing coun-
try governments defend their lax environmental standards by citing economic
growth and increased employment. See Edward J. Williams, The Maquiladora
Industry and Environmental Degradation in the United States-Mexico Borderlands,
27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 765, 772-3 (1996) (noting that Mexico's Programa de Indus-
trializaci6n Fronteriza, which has resulted in the much criticized environ-
mental degradation near the United States-Mexico border, was developed in
1965 to promote industrial relocation and provide jobs).71
Some would argue that harmonized PPM standards would cause compa-
nies to leave, and that jobs would be lost. However, those who accept the the-
ory of comparative advantage would argue that new jobs would be created. See
PAUL KRUGMAN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 145
(1967) (explaining that in theory, job loss, purely as a result of international
trade, should cause temporary economic dislocation).
[Vol 19:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss3/3
THE WTO AND THE ENVIR ONMENT
how many people it would effect, and the extent to which this
would be adequate compensation for the environmental degrada-
tion is quite complex and speculative. What is obvious is that
only in the most fictitious sense are local populations in develop-
ing countries making a collective market decision to choose do-
mestic pollution in exchange for perceived economic rewards.
Rather, a sovereign preference for such environmental degrada-
tion is a function of the observable fact that in most developing
countries, such third party locals are not as politically influential
as producers.
In trade terms, forcing local populations in developing
countries to bear pollution costs is the equivalent of a general tax
on the local population that is being used to subsidize producers.
72
It is well accepted that subsidies that can give a competitive advan-
tage to certain products are not sovereign matters immune from
discipline by the WTO.73 Therefore, understood correctly as a
subsidy, under basic GATT principles, environmental degrada-
tion is not exclusively a matter of domestic concern.
Even if local populations in developing countries could be un-
derstood to be choosing domestic pollution in exchange for per-
ceived economic rewards, the sovereignty rationale for allowing
states to gain an environmental "comparative advantage" still does
not hold. If the prior argument that the effects of environmental
degradation transcend national borders is correct, a choice to cre-
ate an environmental comparative advantage cannot be seen as an
exclusively sovereign matter.
72 Several commentators have analyzed environmental degradation as the
equivalent of a subsidy for trade purposes. See Robert F. Housman & Dur-
wood J. Zaelke, Making Trade and Environmental Policies Mutually Reinforcing:
For ing Competitive Sustainability, 23 ENVTL. L. 545, 555 (1993); Thomas K.
Plofchan, Jr., Recognizing and Countervailing Environmental Subsidies, 26 INT'L
L. 763, 771 (1992). For a more detailed discussion of the conceptual similaritybetween subsidies and the allowance of environmental degradation and how the
WTO dispute resolution system could be used to enforce countervailing duties,
see infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.7P Subsidies aimed solely at exports are explicitly banned by the GATT,
and countries are allowed to impose countervailing duties to make up for subsi-
dies not tied specifically to exports. See GATT 1947 art. VI, art. XVI; Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, in WTO
Agreement, Annex 1A, art. 10, n. 36.
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4. THE DANGER OF THE UNILATERAL ALTERNATIVE TO
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Given the WTO's failure to address environmental concerns,
why should environmentalists work within its framework? Part
of the answer lies in understanding the unsatisfactory nature of
the isolationist approach, manifested by Ralph Nader's suggestion
that the United States consider withdrawing from the WTO,7 4
and unilaterally enforce environmental standards by closing its
markets to oods that are produced in environmentally unaccept-
able ways. Even if the United States were to stop short of with-
drawal from the WTO, such unilateralism would not be the an-
swer.
Most importantly, such a unilateral approach would very
likely be completely ineffective at stemming the long-term tide
towards global environmental degradation. Regulatory standards
which are unilaterally imposed by the United States are simply
not going to be considered legitimate, and countries' willingness
to comply voluntarily with international norms is highly depend-
ent upon their legitimacy.7 6 It is possible, of course, that under
74 See supra note 4.
75 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Nader is not alone in his calls
for the United States to use access to its relatively large marketplace as a means
of advancing social policy goals. For instance, William Greider states the fol-
lowing:
The American political system also has enormous leverage over the
behavior of foreign-owned multinational enterprises-access to the
largest, richest marketplace in the world. Because of that asset, the
United States could lead the way to new international standards of
conduct by first asserting its own values unilaterally. If trade depends
upon price advantage derived mainly from poverty wages for children
or defenseless workers prohibited from organizing their own unions or
factories that cause great environmental destruction, this trade cannot
truly be called free.
The purpose of asserting America's political power through its own
market place would be to create the incentive for a new international
system of global standards, one which all of the trading nations would
negotiate and accept.
WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE? THE BETRAYAL OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 402 (1992).
76 As international law often lacks coercive enforcement mechanisms,
states' willingness to obey various international laws is highly dependent upon
acceptance of their legitimacy. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE
POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 16 (1990) (rendering "[a] partial
definition of legitimacy" as "a property of a rule or rule-making institution which
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the threat of unilateral United States sanctions, some countries
sometimes may be bullied into implementing stricter environ-
mental regulations. However, the United States is obviously not
capable of single-handedly coercing the world into adopting the
comprehensive environmental standards necessary to secure a
world in environmental harmony. In fact, the international ill
will that would result from such a heavy handed American effort
would make it very difficult to create the type of positive negoti-
ating atmosphere conducive to successfully concluding MEAs.
It is true that, if the United States resorts to such an approach,
many countries would probably act unilaterally as well. This
"help," however, would hardly improve the chances of success-
fully meeting global environmental challenges. The success of a
global regime based on each country's establishment of its own
idiosyncratic scheme of excluding foreign goods would be im-
paired by its incoherence. Given the myriad of haphazard and
conflicting requirements for exporting goods that global indus-
itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed normatively"). Franck's
book is the major recent work on the role of legitimacy in international law.
For related commentary, criticism and specific applications of Franck's legiti-
macy theory, see David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of
the Security Council 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 552 (1993); Jonathan I. Charney, Uni-
versal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'LL. 529, 550 (1993); John K. Setear,An
Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and
International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139 (1996). For further discussion of
the concept of legitimacy, see TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW
(1990) (providing an empirical analysis of the correlation between legitimacy
and compliance). See also Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociol-
ogy of Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 379 (1983) (surveying the contemporary use of
legitimacy and offering an alternate explanation focusing on differences among
legal doctrines and individuals).
77 Unilateral trade sanctions to enforce environmental norms are likely to
lead to resentment that would impede the ability to negotiate multilateral envi-
ronmental standards. See GATT, 1 INTERNATIONAL TRADE 21 (1989)
(proclaiming, on behalf of the GATT Secretariat, that negative incentives"are
not an effective way to promote multilateral cooperation _; Daniel P. Caswell,
Comment, The Promised Land: Analysis of Environmental Factors of the United
States Investment in and Development of the Amazon Region in Brazil, 4 NW. J.
INT'L L. & BUS. 517, 544 (1982); Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade Sanc-
tions and the GAT. An Analysis of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environ-
mental Practices, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 751 (1994) ("[T]rade sanctions
are also likely to sour relations, making multilateral cooperation much more
difficult and international agreements harder to achieve.") (quotingNATIONAL
CONSUMER COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE CONSUMER AGENDA
131 (1993)); Piritta Sorsa, GA 77 and Environment: Basic Issues and Some Devel-
oping Country Concerns, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT,
325, 337 (Patrick Low ed., 1992).
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tries would face, any overall benefit to the environment would be
far from ensured.7 8" This ineffectiveness would be compounded
by the political reality that without the discipline of international
oversight, many country regimes would be prone to lose touch
with their environmental raison d'itat. Given the inherent com-
plexity of differentiating between legitimate environmental meas-
ures and disguised trade barriers, such national regimes would be
very susceptible to cooptation by their own domestic protection-
ist interest.7 9
Logistical realities related to the complexity of enforcement
would further undermine such an approach. Given that national
environmental regulators are already over-burdened, ° imagine
78 See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra note 77, at 758 (citing W. Rob Storey, New
Zealand's Minister of Transport, stating that "unilateral measures to reconcile
trade and environmental objectives are likely to be ineffective or counterpro-
ductive"); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Precaution, Participation, and the "Greening of
International Trade Law, 7 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 57, 86 (1992) (acknowledging
that the diverse standards which are a result of unilateral action can be prob-
lematic).
There is the additional concern that in many cases, the offending nation
will be able to direct its exports to another market. See Sorsa, supra note 77, at
337; Kevin C. Kennedy, Reforming U.S. Trade Policy to Protect the Global Envi-
ronment: A MultilateralApproach, 18 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 185, 226 (1994).
79 Commentators have noted the potential for governments, in response to
corporate lobbying, to institute protectionist restrictions in the guise of envi-
ronmental measures. See MichaelI. Jeffery, The Environmental Implications of
NAFTA: A Canadian Perspective, 26 URB. LAW. 31, 48 (1994); Gabriel Cani-
huante, Earth Summit: NGOs Say Free Trade Won't Save the Planet, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Jun. 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Inpres File (noting
that Greenpeace stresses the importance of preventing protectionist regulations
from being presented as environmental measures); John C. Stauber & Sheldon
Rampton, Green PR: Silencing Spring, ENVTL. ACTION, Jan. 1, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 10156375 ("[A] generation of PR executives have become accus-
tomed to donning the green hat.").
8o See Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement:
A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34
BUFF. L. REV. 833 (1985); David R. Hodas,Enforcement of Environmental Law
in a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement
Authority is Shared by The United States, The States and Their Citizens?, 54 MD.
L. REV. 1552 (1995) (arguing that the scarce resources and complex regulator
schemes prevent the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
from providing effective enforcement, and that citizen suits should play a larger
role in enforcement of domestic environmental laws); Paul R. Portney et al.,
The EPA at "Thirtysomething" 21 ENVTL. L. 1461 (1991); Barton H. Thompson,
Jr., The Search for Regulatory Alternatives, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 8 (1996). The
shortage of resources in environmental regulatory and enforcement agencies is
not limited to the United States. See Bacon, supra note 29, at 281. ("National
environmental ministries are generally over-burdened and underfunded.").
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the cost and difficulty (especially, but not only, for poor coun-
tries) of attempting to unilaterally assess environmental problems
in countries all over the world. Countries would be assessing pol-
lution controls in places where technologies and appropriate envi-
ronmental solutions may differ from their own, and where the lo-
cal authorities would have little incentive to be cooperative with
what they would likely deem intrusive foreign regulators.
A unilateral approach would not only fail to protect envi-
ronmental interests, but it could also spell disaster for the interna-
tional trade order. The reality or perception that trade restric-
tions on targeted countries were being used for protectionist ends,
coupled with a general aversion to foreign attempts to export en-
vironmental standards, would very likely lead target countries to
impose their own retaliatory trade restrictions. More fundamen-
tally, significant implosion of the international trading system
would become almost inevitable as disagreements over approaches
to local environmental regulations have caused countries to mutu-
ally restrict the import of each others products. A consideration
of the arguments for and against free trade is outside the scope of
this Article.8 1 Suffice it to say, however, that as we learned in the
1930s, such an implosion of the international trading system
could cause widespread and serious economic hardship for many
people, even heightening the possibility for war. 82
8 For a limited reference to the historically most accepted economic the-
ory in support of international trade, see supra notes 62-65 and accompanying
text (discussing David Ricardo and the theory of competitive advantage). For a
more extensive discussion about the policy concerned raised by international
trade, see DOUGLAS A. IRWiN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY OF FREE TRADE (1996) (providing a review and analysis of the major
arguments both for and against free trade). See also MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK &
ROBERT HowsE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1-17 (1995)
(offering a brief discussion of the underlying theories in favor of free trade and
some key criticisms); James Bovard, The Morality of Protectionism, 25 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 235 (1993) (highlighting the negative impacts of protectionist
measures); Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the
United States with Implications for. International Trade in Europe, 26 GEO.
WASH. J. INT L L. & ECON. 539 (1993) (giving a concise account of the argu-
ments both for and against free trade from the perspective of a free trade sup-
porter). See generally Low, supra note 38 (examining the GATT and the trade
policy of the United States); Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Challenges to the Doctrine of
Free Trade, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 219 (1993) (discussing how demands
for fair trade and harmonization of domestic policies and institutions in trading
nations have multiplied).
82 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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5. ACCOMPLISHING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
WITH THE HELP OF THE WTO
5.1. WTO's Limitations as a Forum of Environmental
Regulation
Clearly, when the implications are examined, unilateralism is
not the answer. Global environmental regulation requires a mul-
tilateral regime. Many environmentalists accept this, but never-
theless argue that the WTO should not be that regime." They do
not believe that the Organization can make the transition from
promoting "environmental sovereignty" into a force for global
environmentalism. They contend that it is inherently biased in
favor of business and against environmental interests.8 4  In sup-
83 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GA 7T, The ICJ &
Trade-Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1043 (1994) (arguing that the
WTO's "trade first" philosophy cannot be reconciled with the need for envi-
ronmental preservation). Several commentators and environmentalists have
advocated the formation of a body designed to balance environmental and trade
concerns. For one of the most persuasive works, see id. at 1045 (arguing that
such an organization would be able to recognize the"interdependent nature of
global economic and environmental issues... [and] should have access to scien-
tific and technical expertise which would enable it to resolve trade-environment
disputes knowledgeably"). See also Stephen A. Silard, The Global Environment
Facility: A New Development in International Law and Organization, 28 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 607 (1995); Lori Wallach,Hiddn Dangers of GA TT
and NAFTA, in THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE 59 (1993) (calling for the
formulation of a new environmentally friendly body for the reso ution of
trade-environment disputes).
Commentators and environmentalists have also proposed the establish-
ment of an independent tribunal to adjudicate trade-environment disputes. See
Dunoff, supra at 1106; Charles R. Fletcher, Greening World Trade: Reconciling
GA 7T and Multilateral Environmental Agreements within the Existing World
Trade Regime, 5J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 341 (1996); Alison Raina Ferrante,
Comment, The Dolphin/Tuna Controversy and Environmental Issues: Will the
World Trade Organization's 'Arbitration Court" and the International Court of
Justice's Chamber for Environmental Matters Assist the United States and the
World in Furthering Environmental Goals?, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 279,
306 (1996) (suggesting that the ICJ may be an appropriate organization). For a
description of the WTO dispute resolution system and my arguments for using
it to adjudicate environmental disputes, see infra notes 93-101 and accompany-
ing text.84 ..Commentators in a Worldwatch Institute publication charge, "the decks
are stacked against the environmental cause at the GATT" as a result of the
"pro-trade bent of the organization and the limited nature of the exceptions to
its rules that are granted to preserve human health and natural resources."
Costly Tradeoffs: Reconciling Trade and the Environment, WORLDWATCH PAPER
113 (1993), quoted in GA TT Biased Against Protection of Environment, World-
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port of this contention they point to its fundamental mandate and
mind set of advancing free trade. 5 They point to its traditional
function as a forum where governments represented by trade min-
istries bargain for trade concessions on behalf of various industrial
constituents.8 6 Finally, they point to its secretive and exclusion-
ary processes under which environmentalists have a hard time
watch Report Says, 16 INT'L ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 248 (Apr. 7, 1993); see also
Dunnoff, supra note 83, at 1047 ("When global environmental concerns come
before the GATT, they are invariably subordinated to the economic and trade
interests that the GATT is designed to serve."). Several commentators have ar-
gued that, as a result of its history and focus, the WTO will never be able to
give appropriate deference to environmental concerns. See U.S. Coalition De-
cries WTO Gasoline Finding, Feb. 21, 1996 ("Public Citizen and Friends of the
Earth said the WTO... places trade liberalization above all other concerns.".
Others have pointed to the fact that the WTO/GATT mandate is to break
down trade barriers, and many environmental agreements seek to use trade
measures as a means of enforcement. See Wold, supra note 37, at 894. Wold
does not o so far as to say, however, that the WTO is an altogether inappro-
priate entity to oversee trade-environment matters, only that significant con-
flicts exist in several areas and that to be effective, reform would be required of
both the WTO and MEAs. See id.
8 For example, one environmentally minded commentator writes that at-
tempts to reconcile trade measures with environmental concerns have failed be-
cause strategies in trade negotiations generally "are built upon the premise that
free trade is more important than protecting the environment." Alberto
Bernabe-Riefkohl, "To Dream the Impossible Dream ": Globalization and Har-
monization of Environmental Laws, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 205, 207
(1995); see Wallach, supra note 83, at 28.
While many have argued that the WTO is the nemesis of MEAs, others
have proposed varying degrees of reform which arguably would make the
WTO a more even-handed arbiter of trade-environmental issues. See Wold, su-
pra note 37; Anna Beth Snoderly, Note, Clearing the Air: Environmental Regu-
lation, Dispute Resolution, and Domestic Sovereignt Under the World Trade Or-
ganization, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 241 (1996).
86 Michael McCloskey of the Sierra Club has said of the WTO, "there's
nobody there to represent our interests." Charles T. Haag, Comment,Legiti-
mizing "Environmental" Legislation Under the GA 77 in Light of the GAFE Panel
Report: More Fuel for the Protectionists?, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 79, 89; see also
Gene Grossman, In Poor Regions, Environmental Law..., N.Y. TIMES FORUM,
Mar. 1, 1992, at 11 (stating that environmentalists are concerned that the WTO
is only concerned with the interests of big business). Environmentalists have
also expressed concern that the WTO talks "shut environmentalists out of the
decision-making process, while their business opponents are heavily represented
on advisory groups." Dunnesupra note 7; Nader, supra note 58, at 5; Ralph Z.
Hallow, Gingrich Stood Behind GATT Because We Gave Our Word'. WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 1994, at A6 (quoting Ralph Nader as stating that the WTO
Agreement was designed by the big corporations, 
for the big corporations ).
87 See Wiliam M. Reichert, Note, Resolvng the Trade and Envronment
Conflict The XTO and NGO Consultative Relations, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL
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gaining a seat at the table.88 While these arguments raise real
problems, they overlook the fact that the GATT historically, and
to a lesser extent the WTO today, do not have an agenda distinct
from that of their member states. Until very recently, the WTO
had a small secretariat that rarely took action which could be con-
strued as independent of direct control by its member states.
89
TRADE 219 (1996). Although the WTO has taken some steps towards increased
transparency,
Dispute settlement panels continue to be held in closed sessions; the
V will not release basic biographical information about panel-
ists... ; panel reports are not release to the public until after a report
is adopted; [nongovernmental organizations] NGOs may not observe
regular meetings of the WTO General Council and, indeed, minutes of
these meetings remain secret for two years; and finally all WTO com-
mittees ... convene in closed session ....
Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World
Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331, 333-34 (1996). Charno-
vitz states that not only does the WTO lack a legitimate reason for the exclu-
sion, NGOs could make meaningful contributions to the WTO. See id. at 356-
57.
89 A major criticism of the GATT and the WTO has been their reluctance
to grant NGOs sufficient access to the WTO or provide for a meaningful ex-
change of information. See Gharnovitz, supra note 87. Charnovitz advocates
increased participation by NGOs, noting the minimal role they are afforded atthe 'WTO in refation to other intergovernmental organizations ( IGOs). See
id. at 335. "[S]ome critics described the GATT as having 'secret' trade negotia-
tions. Reichert, supra note 87, at 225-26 (advocating a greater role for NGOs
in the WTO); see also Wallach, supra note 83, at 60 (advocating that GATT be
reformed to allow for more open proceedings). One commentator advocates
the use of the "trade stakeholder's model" in the WTO. See G. Richard Shell,
Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World
Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 910 (1995) ("The Trade Stakeholder's
Model emphasizes direct participation in trade disputes not only by states and
businesses, but also by groups that are broadly representative of diverse citizen
interests."); see also Dunne, supra note 7 ("[E]nvironmentalists have a distaste for
what seems to them the undemocratic GATT practice of behind-doors negotia-
tion.").
8 The WTO Secretariat as bureaucracies go is not large. See HOUSE WAYS
AND MEANS TRADE SUBCOMMITEE, Testimony of Ambassador Michael Kan-
tor , Mar. 13, 1996,available in 1996 WL 7136812. Its predecessor, the GATT,
likewise had a secretariat with a staff of approximately 400. See GA 7-Short
for Lower Duties, More Trade, More Jobs, AGENCE FR.-PREsSE, Dec. 14, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, News/Wires File. Although intended as a
criticism of the WTO, Alan Tonelson has stated, "The WTO is going to set
precedents and hand down rulings that reflect the values, policies and practices
of the majority of its member states." Ian Jones, Fair Deal or Foreign Threat?,
WORLD TRADE, Jan. 1997, at 24-28. Former United States deputy trade repre-
sentative, Jules Katz, has observed that the WTO is a "paper tiger" by design.
Id.; see also Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal
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While national trade ministries, with an arguable bias in favor
of trade over environmental protection, are the lead agencies
working with the WTO, this arrangement is not written in stone.
In fact, to the extent environmental matters begin to come before
the WTO, states are likely to increasingly rely on environmental
ministries in dealing with the WTO. This means that, ultimately,
the ability to overcome existing institutional bias and to make the
environmental voice heard is contingent upon the overall strength
of the global environmental movement and not upon the ephem-
eral architecture of the trade regime.
In addition to concerns about institutionalized bias, some en-
vironmentalists argue (oddly enough, together with the anti-
environmentalists) that the WTO lacks the expertise necessary to
create and monitor environmental agreements because it was not
founded as an environmental organization. 90 Just as there is no
inherent reason why the Organization's anti-environmental bias
cannot be overcome, so too is there no inherent reason why such
expertise cannot be acquired. The World Bank was certainly not
established as an environmental organization and yet, born out of
a realization of the connection between development, lending,
and the environment, the World Bank established an environ-
Order for World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349, 355-56 (1995) (concluding
that the WTO presents neither a qualitative change in the scope and functions
of GATT nor the advent of a supranational trade institution with power and
authority to usurp sovereignty from its Member Nations). Some commenta-
tors have concluded that the WTO has "no more real power than.., the
GATT." Results of the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the
Senate Finance Committee, 103d Cong. 197 (1994) (quoting prepared statement
of law professor, John H. Jackson). For a discussion of how member state atti-
tudes are specifically reflected in the WTO's environmental policies, see Geza
Feketekuty, The Link Between Trade and Environmental Policy, 2 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 171, 200 (1993) (discussing the organization's approach to en-
vironmental matters, specifically noting that the decision to replace the long
dormant GATT working party on the environment with the CTE reflected the
desires of the membership).
9 "[T]he GATT is not equipped to become involved in the tasks of review-
ing national environmental priorities, setting environmental standards, or de-
veloping global policies on the environment." Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Resolving
Trade.Environment Conflicts: The Case for Trading Institutions, 27 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 607, 608 (1994) (citing a Report by Ambassador Hidetoshi Ukawa,
Chairman, Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade). Dun-
off advocates the removal of trade-environment issues to a"forum expressly de-
signed to address these difficult issues." Id. See generally Report of the WTO
Committee on Trade and the Environment, supra note 36 (noting that the WTO
is limited in scope and competence to those environmental matters which sub-
stantially affect trade).
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mental department and now requires environmental impact
statements on loans. Similar institutional changes have also oc-
curred at the major regional 
development banks.
91 The World Bank now requires Environmental Impact Statements "for
projects potentially involving 'diverse and significant environmental impacts.'"
World Bank Operational Directive 4.00, Annex A, Environmental Assessment
(Oct. 31, 1989). The potential environmental impact of the proposed project
determines the depth of analysis required. See David Young, Comment, The
Application of Environmental Impact Statements to United States Participation in
Multinational Development Projects, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 317, 336,
n.106 (1992); see also William Prince & David Nelson, Developing an Environ-
mental Model Piecing Together the Growing Diversity of International Environ-
mental Standards and Agendas Affecting Mining Companies, 7 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y. 247, 280-81 (1996) (-The purpose of Environmental As-
sessments is to ensure that the development options under consideration are
environmentally sound and sustainabe, and at any environmental conse-
quences are recognized early in the project cycle and taken into account in pro-
ject design.") (quoting World Bank Operational Directive 4.00,supra); Nicholas
A. Robinson, The 1991 Bellagio Conference on U.S.-U.S.S.R. Environmental Insti-
tution Protection Institution: International Trends in Environmental Impact As-
sessment, 19 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 591, 602 (1992) (comparing Environ-
mental Impact Assessment ("EIA") provisions in various different regulatory
regimes including that of the World Bank).
In addition to the establishment of an Environmental department and re-
quiring EJAs, the World Bank, in cooperation with UNEP and the United Na-
tions Development Program ("UNDP"), is administering the Global Environ-
ment Facility ("GEF"). See Young, supra. The EFF was designed to facilitatethe transfer of funds to developing countries to help offset the cost of imple-
menting environmental initiatives. See Kyle W. Danish, International Envi-ronmental Law and the "Bottom-Up" Approach: A Review of the Desertification
Convention, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 133 (1995); David Reed, TheGlobal Environment Facility and Non-Governmental Or~ganizations, 9 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 191 (1993). In addition, the World Bank has published athree volume Environmental Assessment Sourcebook. See Prince & Nelson,
supra.92 The World Bank and the Regional Development Banks have agreed that
they "[w]iU, to the best of their abilities, endeavour to... [i]nstitute procedures
for systematic examination of all development activities, including policies,
programs and projects, under consideration for financing to ensure that appro-
priate measures are proposed for compliance with Section I." Declaration on
Environmental Policies and Procedures Relating to Economic Development,Feb. 1, 1980, 19 IL.M. 524 (relating to the importance of sustainab evelop-
ment and the protection of the environment). The Asian Development Ban
has instituted a two-tiered environmental assessment program. See Prince &
Nelson, supra note 91, at 283. An Initial Environmental Examination ("lEE) is
required for projects that are likely to impact the environment. Id. If the lEEprojects a sustantial adverse impact on the environment, a formal EIA is re-
quired. Id.
"The African Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank
and the Asian Development Bank have all set up environmental units." Wil-
liam Wilson, Environmental Law as Developed Assistance, 22 ENVTL. L. 953, 969
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To be clear, I wish to emphasize that I am not proposing a
specific, definitive environmental mandate for the WTO. While
institutional change is possible, there may be many reasons, in-
cluding the extent to which critical expertise could be best found
outside the WTO, that the WTO should not take the lead in
global environmental regulation. There are clearly many ways
the Organization could play a role in the negotiation and en-
forcement of global environmental agreements. My purpose here
is to point to the advantages that the WTO offers generally, not
to rigidly advance any particular institutional structure as neces-
sary for implementing these advantages.
5.2. Taking Advantage of the WTO's Compliance Mechanisms
5.2.1. Dispute Resolution Under the WTO
Not only can the Organization's deficiencies as a forum for
global environmental regulation be overcome if the political sup-
port can be garnered, but also certain qualities unique to the
WTO's trade mission make it well suited to be such a forum.
Another facet of the previously mentioned connection between
trade and the environment is that it provides a formal justification
for resorting to the WTO's trade-based dispute resolution system
to enforce international environmental standards.
Under this dispute resolution system, 93 parties must first at-
tempt to resolve their conflict through joint consultation.94  If
such consultations are unproductive, the parties may agree to re-
quest good offices conciliation or mediation from the Director
General of the WTO.95 If no settlement is forthcoming, the
(1992) (citing U.K. OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, ENVI-
RONMENT AND THE BRITISH AID PROGRAM 35 (1990)).
9 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, in WTO Agreement, Annex 2 [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding or DSU Agreement].
9' Where one party requests consultation as set forth in the agreement, the
other party must 'enter into consultations in good faith within a period of no
more than 30 days." Id. art. 4, para. 3. "Members affirm their resolve to
strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the consultation procedures em-
ployed by Members." Id. art. 4, para. 1.
9 See id. art. 5, paras. 1, 6. The parties may request good offices, concilia-
tion and mediation. See id. art. 5, para. 3. The complaining party may request
the formation of a panel where procedures for good offices, conciliation or me-
diation has terminated. See id.
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complaining party can request adjudication by a three member
panel. After a decision is rendered, the losing party may appeal
issues of law and legal interpretation to a permanent appellate
body.97 A final decision becomes binding unless the entire WTO
membership agrees that a decision should not be adopted.9' Since
this unanimity requirement necessitates that the winning party
agree to forego its own victory, such adoption by the membership
is almost certain. After adoption, the losing party must either
comply with the decision or offer compensation.
9 9
Parties seldom defy adverse decisions. In a well known study,
Professor Hudec found that even under the older and much
weaker GATT system, panel decisions were generally honored.'
96 See id. art. 6, para. 1; art. 8, para. 5. Where the complaining party re-
quests the establishment of a pane, one shall be formed unless the "DSB
[Dispute Settlement Body] decides by consensus not to establish a panel." Id.
art. 6, para. 1.
9 See id. art. 17, paras. 1, 4. "A standing Appellate Body shall be estab-
lished by the DSB." Id. art. 17, para. 1. Although the Appellate Body will have
seven members, three individuals will serve on a given case. See id.
98 See id. art. 16, paras. 3, 4 (relating to DSB reports); see id. art. 17, para. 14
(pertaining to appellate review).
Under the old GATT system, any member who did not concur in the
panel's decision could block the decision from being formally adopted. See G.
Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties
in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 359, 362 (1996)
(elaborating on the differences between the former GATT and current WTO
legal systems); Azar M. Khansari, Note, Searching for the Perfect Solution: Inter-
national Dispute Resolution and the New World Trade Organization, 20
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 183, 185 (1996) (commenting on the inade-
quacy and inefficiency of allowing "a single vote, including the vote of the party
that lost the case, to block approval of a panel's decision and prevent it from
becoming substantive law"); see also Matthew Schaefer, National Review of
WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: In the Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced WTO
Rule Compliance?, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 304-14 (1996)
(summarizing the distinctions between the old system and the Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding ("DSU")).
99 See Dispute Settlement Understanding, art. 3, paras. 1, 3 (noting that
immediate compliance, or if impracticable, compliance within a reasonable time
is "essential to the effective functioning of the WTO"). Where recommenda-
tions are not implemented within a reasonable time, a member must pay com-
pensation to the aggrieved member(s). See id. art. 22, paras. 1, 2. Compensation
is deemed to be a temporary measure. See id. art. 22, para. 1.
10 Professor Hudec and his co-authors attempt to provide a statistical
analysis of the effectiveness of GATT dispute resolution procedures. Robert E.
Hudec et al., A Statistical Profile of GA TT Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948-1989, 2
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1993). They focus their analysis on the 207 com-
plaints arising between 1948 and 1989. See id. at 3. Of those legally valid com-
plaints, sixty-seven are known to have resulted in violation rulings. See id. at
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In part, this is because states have a strong economic interest in
maintaining the integrity of the international trading order and,
in part, because the Organization's regulation of world trade pro-
vides the opportunity to employ a powerful system of trade sanc-
tions. If a party is found to be in breach of WTO rules and does
not correct the situation or pay compensation, the prevailing
party can seek permission from the WTO membership to with-
draw trade concessions previously given to the losing party. 10 1 Be-
cause such remedial sanctions are backed by the Organization, the
reputational cost to the loser of retaliating in kind is very high.
This minimizes the potential for dangerous trade wars to develop.
5.2.2. Directly Enforcing PPM Standards with the WTO
System
Because the WTO's adjudicatory system is so effective, its ap-
plication to environmental disputes could serve to greatly enhance
the enforcement of global environmental agreements. Notably,
the system is well suited to effectively enforcing multilaterally
agreed upon PPM standards. The practices of any country alleged
to not be in compliance with WTO-supported environmental
standards, could be opened to challenge within the WTO dispute
resolution system described above. Under this system, if a WTO
panel or appellate body ultimately found a country's practices not
to be in conformance with PPM standards, the country could be
required to remedy the infraction, pay compensation, or face
trade sanctions. Non-compliance by member states with their ob-
ligations to enforce basic international PPM standards, such as
those regulating air or water quality, might constitute a competi-
tive disadvantage to a wide array of industrial producers all over
the world. In most conflicts under the GATT either particular
tariffs or regulations are alleged to illegally disadvantage a limited
10. According to the authors, 90% of those rulings"ended with a positive out-
come." Id. More specifically, "just over half of the violation rulings achieved
full compliance directly, two-thirds resulted in full compliance somehow, and
nine out of ten produced a worthwhile positive result." Id.
101 If no satisfactory compensation has been agreed within 20 days af-
ter the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time, any party hav-
ing invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request authoriza-
tion from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member
concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered
agreements.
Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 22, para. 2.
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number of products from specific countries. In contrast a failure
by a country to adhere to basic international environmental pro-
duction standards would disadvantage industrial competitors all
around the world giving causes of action to all, or nearly all,
countries. Under the present system, each of these countries
would have the right to bring a claim, and if compliance was not
forthcoming, each would have the right to compensation. Be-
cause countries violating WTO-enforced environmental rules
would face potentially costly legal actions by so many other coun-
tries, the legal incentive to comply with such rules would be even
stronger than it already is to comply with the traditional rules of
international trade.
5.2.3. Alternative Remedial Schemes
Two other remedial schemes within the WTO system allow
members, on their own initiative, to restrict trade in furtherance
of organizationally sanctioned goals. These could ultimately be
adapted to induce countries to comply with international PPM
standards. The first would be for the Organization to allow
members to ban the importation of goods that they determine not
to be produced in accordance with WTO-sanctioned environ-
mental regulations. This would be analogous to the Organiza-
tion's current practice of permitting members to ban goods that
are made with prison labor. 02 Alternatively, the Organization
could authorize members to place what is called a "countervailing
duty" on goods that they determine to result from production
processes not in conformance with WTO-sanctioned environ-
mental standards. Countervailing duties are surcharges on im-
ported goods and, in this case, would be equal to the savings that
producers realized from not having met the more stringent inter-
nationally defined environmental standards.0 3
The Organization currently allows states to impose counter-
vailing duties when foreign companies "dump" goods into their
markets at less than the market value, and to offset the previously
discussed 0 4 competitive trade advantage that foreign companies
102 The GATT permits "the adoption or enforcement by any contracting
party of measures... (e) relating to the products of prison labour," so long as
such measures are not discriminatory or "a disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade." GATT 1947 art. XX(e).
103 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
104 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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gain when they receive subsidies from their governments. 105 In
fact, some environmentalists have argued that lax local environ-
mental production standards should be considered de facto subsi-
dies under existing law. 106 While many technical difficulties
would need to be overcome to accurately assess the appropriate
level of such countervailing duties,'0 7 in theory, said duties could
105 The GATT allows for the importing country to impose duties on goods
where the goods are being "dumped" (sold below fair value or at less than the
cost of production). See GATT 1947 art. II. In addition, a member may, in
some cases, impose a countervailing duty on goods which have been subsidized
by the exporting member nation. See WTO Agreement, art. X. For further
discussion on dumping and subsidies under the GATT, see Claire Moore Dick-
erson, GA 7T 1994: Fool's Goal?, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 259, 264-
65 (1996); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Injuy in Antidumping and Counter-
vailing Duty Cases, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 5, 19-23 (1996). Although the
GATT contained provisions pertaining to antidumping and countervailing du-
ties, this area has changed significantly following the Uruguay Round. See
James A. Meszaros, Note, Application of the United States' Law of Countervailing
Duties to Nonmarket Imports: Effects of the Recent Foreign Reforms, 2 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 463, 466-67 (1996) (describing the changes in U.S. counter-
vailing duty obligations following the Uruguay Round).
Numerous commentators have proposed that weak environmental
standards be considered a subsidy or unfair trade practice.
A lack of adequate environmental regulation or effective enforcement
would be characterized as dumping. Hence the imported goods would
be subject to countervailing duties equal to the amount that the ex-
porter was thought to have saved by not having to install appropriate
controls. Alternatively, the lack of environmental regulation could be
characterized as an indirect subsidy....
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation: The International Organi-
zation for Standardization and Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environ-
ment, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 479, 521 (1995); see Thomas J, Schoenbaum, Interna-
tional Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search For
Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 288-89 (1997) (noting that scholars have
called for the adoption of "countervailing or 'eco-dumping' duties on products
from countries that some believe constitute 'pollution havens' where products
are made without adequate environmental controls"); Joel L. Silverman, The
"Giant Sucking Sound" Revisited: A Blueprint to Prevent Pollution Havens by Ex-
tending NAFTA's Unheralded 'Eco-Dumping" Provisions to the New World Trade
Organization, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 347, 372-73 (1994) ("[W]eak and in-
effectual enforcement of pollution control measures should also be included in
the definition of unfair trading practices.") (quoting GORE, supra note 52).
107 Most significantly, it would be difficult to calculate the extent of the
subsidy-like cost savings enjoyed by producers as a result of lax environmental
standards. See Robert F. Housman & Durwood J. Zaelke, Making Trade and
Environmental Policies Mutually Reinforcing: Forging Competitive Sustainability,
23 ENVTL. L. 545, 555 (1993) (acknowledging that there would be some valua-
tion difficulties, and discussing various ways of attempting to value environ-
mental subsidies, for the purpose of assessing the amount of countervailing du-
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be used to negate the cost advantage that companies enjoy by bas-
ing production in foreign markets that have lax standards. If
states were unable to entice companies by offering this regulatory
cost advantage, they would lose much of their incentive to disre-
gard globalized environmental standards.
To the extent there is a potential for countries to unjustifia-
bly implement product bans or countervailing duties, the Organi-
zation's dispute resolution and enforcement system could guard
against the problem. Instead of members using the system to di-
rectly challenge alleged environmental infractions, they, on their
own, target remedial actions against countries with relatively defi-
cient environmental standards. These targeted countries are then
the parties that must, if they feel such remedial actions are unjusti-
fied, seek redress through the dispute resolution system.
5.2.4. Assessing the Enforcement Alternatives
The rapidly changing global institutional and political situa-
tion, with respect to the environment, makes it difficult to antici-
pate the relative merits of pursuing variations of these alterna-
tives. Nevertheless, a few very basic comparisons can be made.
The first alternative, legalizing bans on products not produced in
conformance with the environmental standards of importing
countries, would be very destructive to global trade for many of
the same reasons that apply to previously discussed non-legalized
unilateral bans. While WTO-sanctioned bans would ultimately
be subject to WTO multilateral surveillance and discipline, the
initial determination of whether to institute them would be influ-
enced by each state's own idiosyncratic environmental standards
and would lie with the states themselves, which would be subject
to cooptation by local protectionist interests. Given its problems,
this remedy should be reserved for those narrowly tailored cases
where fundamental questions of values are at stake. These might
include cases of animal mistreatment 0 8 or species survival, rather
ties); Kevin C. Kennedy, Reforming U.S. Trade Policy to Protect the Global Envi-
ronment: A Multilateral Approach, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 185, 215-16 (1994)
("In a country with little environmental regulation, the benefit of noncompli-
ance could not be measured by estimating the cost of compliance borne by
other industries in that country.").
'0' With the growth and development of factory farming in the United
States, legalized cruelty to farm animals has become a serious problem. Given
the deficiency of standards at home, the United States would have great diffi-
culty justifying trade sanctions against other countries. See generally JOHN
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than cases of contention over differences in laws regulating pollu-
tion generally.
The use of countervailing environmental duties as an alterna-
tive has the benefit of helping to offset the cost advantage produc-
ers' gain as a result of operating in regimes with lax environ-
mental standards. Therefore, this use would encourage countries
to upwardly harmonize their environmental standards. While far
less destructive of global trade than an allowance of bans, this al-
ternative has its problems. The inherent difficulty of distinguish-
ing between legitimate environmental duties and disguised restric-
tions on trade'0 9 would increase the likely advent of many
disputes which would be difficult to resolve satisfactorily. Be-
cause of its authority, expertise, and impartiality, the decisions of
the WTO dispute resolution system would likely be followed.
Nevertheless, fundamental and potentially extremely divisive
disagreements would persist. The WTO membership, however,
may find that the best alternative, an agreement on acceptably
rigorous substantive international PPM standards, is elusive. If
so, countervailing environmental duties have the unique ability to
meet the twin objectives of allowing each member to maintain its
own environmental standards while, at the same time, reducing
the incentive for countries to lower their environmental stan-
dards.
ROBBINS, DIET FOR A NEW AMERICA (1987) (describing and documenting tor-
ture and otherwise cruel treatment of animals on America's factory farms).
109 Under the present system, it can often be difficult to distinguish legiti-
mate duties imposed to offset an unfair trade advantage and protectionist meas-
ures. See E. Kwaku Andoh, Note, Countervailing Duties in a Not Quite Perfect
World: An Economic Analysis, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1515 (1992) (noting the inher-
ent risk that countervailing duties will be imposed for protectionist reasons);
Seoul Hesitates to Offer Special Central Bank Loan to Kia, AsIA PULSE, July 24,
1997 (noting that there is concern that governmental assurances of repayment
of loans may violate WTO subsidyprovision). If lower environmental stan-
dards held the potential to be considered as a subsidy for purposes of imposi-
tion of a countervailing duty, the confusion and potential for abuse would be
exacerbated. See Michael B. Smith, Trade and the Environment: GA 77, Trade,
and the Environment, 23 ENVTL. L. 533, 539 (1993) ("The potential for protec-
tionist mischief boggles the mind.").
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5.3. The Advantages of Using the WTO as a Forum to Negotiate
International Environmental Agreements
5.3.1. Noting the Political Realities
Use of the WTO compliance system to enforce environmental
agreements does not necessarily imply using the WTO as a forum
to negotiate globally harmonized PPM standards. Utilization of
the WTO as a negotiating forum, however, would offer signifi-
cant advantages of its own. Reaching an agreement on effective
globally harmonized environmental standards is undoubtedly go-
ing to be extremely difficult no matter what arena is chosen, and
ultimately will depend upon the strength of the environmental
movement. There is no getting around the difficult reality that
developing countries and many business interests oppose interna-
tionally harmonized PPM standards. Businesses oppose the stan-
dards because of the costs, while developing countries oppose the
standards because they want to maintain their perceived competi-
tive advantage."o By including environmental negotiations as
part of a WTO comprehensive trade round, such opposition to
global environmental production standards, as we will see, can be
at least partially neutralized.
5.3.2. Securing Developing Countries'Agreement
Until most recently, the offer of economic aid has been the
only method available to induce reluctant developing countries to
join environmental regimes."' The Global Environmental Facil-
10 The maintenance of relaxed environmental standards, all else being
equal, gives developing countries a com petitive advantage over nations with
higher environmental standards. See Carl F. Schwenker, Note, Protecting the
Environment and U.S. Competitiveness in the Era of Free Trade: A Proposal, 71
TEX. L. REv. 1355, 1369 (1993) (noting that less stringent standards or lax en-
forcement schemes may translate into reduced compliance costs).
1 Direct financial transfers have been useful in persuading developing
countries to adhere to MEAs. See William Wilson, Environmental Law as De-
velopment Assistance, 22 ENVTL. L. 953 (1992) (noting the widespread associa-
tion of development assistance to LDCs with environmental considerations);
Revisiting Rio, J. COM., June 18, 1997, at 6A (noting that the pervasive linking
of development assistance with environmental reforms in LDCs has been inef-
fective); Jonathan C. Randal, Third World Seeks Aid Before Joining Ozone Pact,
WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1989, at A16 (referring to developing nations as maintain-
ing that "they would delay joining a ban on chemicals harmful to the atmos-
phere's protective ozone shield until industrialized countries committed them-
selves to financial and technical aid"); see also Bradley C. Bobertz & Robert L.
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ity and the Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund"3 were es-
tablished for this purpose. By linking harmonized PPM standards
to trade pacts in future WTO negotiating rounds, a new means of
securing developing country acceptance of such standards-the
maintenance of access to international markets-would be avail-
able. Today, having committed to export led growth policies,
almost all countries perceive a tremendous need to maintain mar-
ket access. Developing countries, in particular, increasingly see
participation in WTO trade agreements as an economic necessity.
Continued access to global markets is likely to become even more
important in the future. Integrating environmental negotiations
into trade rounds will therefore continue to produce a very po-
tent incentive to accept international PPM standards.
The present system of stand-alone environmental agreements
not only lacks alternative means for inducing reluctant countries
to participate in global environmental agreements, but it also dis-
courages participation by some countries-namely those envi-
Fischman, Administrative Appeal Reform: The Case of the Forest Service, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 371, 414 (1993) (noting that the United States pledges $150 mil-
lion to aid developing countries to maintain sustainable forest protection); John
Ntambirweki, The Developing Countries in the Evolution of an International En-
vironmental Law, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 905, 911-16 (1991)
(claiming that international environmental regulations embody provisions of-
fering support to developing countries); Daniel T. Jenks, Note, The Convention
on Biological Diversity-An Efficient Framework for the Preservation of Life on
Earth?, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 636, 661 (1995) (discussing the financial
commitment made by the developed world to aid the LDCs in complying with
the Biological Diversity Convention).
112 For a description of the GEF and the World Bank's role in its admini-
stration, see supra note 91. For a comprehensive discussion on the develop-
ment, structure, and functions of the GEF, see Stephen A. Silard, supra note 83;
GREENING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 149-62 (Jacob Werksman ed.,
1996).
113 The London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol provided for the
establishment of the Multilateral Fund. See Amendment to the Montreal Pro-
tocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 30 I.L.M. 541, 550 (1991).
The Multilateral Fund was designed to provide developing countries the finan-
cial assistance necessary to comply with the Montreal Protocol. See Jennifer S.
Bales, Transnational Responsibility and Recourse for Ozone Depletion, 19 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 259 (1996); Elliot B. Staffin, Trade Barrier or Trade
Boon? A Critical Evaluation of Environmental Labeling and Its Role in the
"Greening" of World Trade, 21 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 205 (1996). The Fund is
administered by the World Bank, UNEP, and UNDP, and will provide financ-
ing and distribute technological information. See Jason M. Paths, The Multilat-
eral Fund of the Montreal Protocol: A Prototype for Financial Mechanisms in Pro-
tecting the Global Environment, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 181, 198 (1992).
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ronmentally-minded developing countries which are predisposed,
in the absence of compensation, to agree to global environmental
standards. In a classic example of the "free-rider problem,""
14
these countries are unlikely to impose the costs of complying
with global standards on domestic producers when other similarly
situated countries refuse to do the same. Even if some developing
countries were to accept an unequal burden, effective global ac-
tion requires participation by a critical mass of countries.
While it is relatively easy to secure participation by developed
countries 115 whose industries are already required to meet rela-
tively stringent environmental laws, 1 6 future population and eco-
114 Free-rider problems are among the most common forms of collective
action problems that exist in essentially three forms: free-rider problems, com-
munication and coordination problems, and rational apathy problems. See
MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 1-2 (1965); OETER
C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRO-
DUCTION 222 (1986). For specific application to environmental problems, see
MANAGING THE COMMONS (Garett Hardin & John Baden eds., 1977).
115 Some developed countries are generally inclined to push harder for
meaningful global accords than are others. See Richard B. Stewart, Environ-
mental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2052
(1993). The record of the United States has been mixed. While the United
States has been at the forefront of pushing for some global environmental
agreements, it was very reluctant to commit to binding limitations on green-
house gasses. See Hilary F. French, Reforming the United Nations to Ensure En-
vironmentally Sustainable Development, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 559, 591-92 (1994); see also In the Americas, MIAMI HERALD, May 11,
1995, at A20 (stating that the United States would most likely oppose a side
agreement dealing with the environment if Chile were to join NAFTA).
In addition, once environmental treaty regimes are established, developed
nations do not always do everything necessary to implement the goals or man-
dates of MEAs. See generally Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcement and the Suc-
cess of Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 47 (1995) (noting
several examples of developed nation actions which are either not in compli-
ance with MEAs or demonstrate a lack of commitment to the environment
while in compliance). The record of the United States complying with MEAs
already in force is also ambiguous. See Save the Worlds Climate, ST. LOUIS
POST DISPATCH, June 25, 1997, at 6B (noting the failure to meet non-binding
Rio targets); see also Hamish MacDonell, America Urged to Act Over Greenhouse
Gas, PRESS ASSOC. NEwSFILE, June 22, 1997 ("[O]nly the UK and Germany
have met the Rio Target of stabilizing greenhouse-gas emissions at 1990 lev-
els."); Robert Samuelson, The Hypocrisy Over Global Warming, CHI. TRIB., July
11, 1997, at 21 (noting that United States emissions of greenhouse gasses are
disproportionately high); Warren P. Strobel & Betsy Pisik, Clinton Pledges War
on Global Warming: But Critics Blast Lack of Definitive Emissions Standards,
WASH. TIMES, June 27, 1997, at All.
116 As previously discussed, such globalized standards may benefit the in-
dustries of developed countries by forcing overseas competitors to pay the costs
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nomic growth (along with corresponding increases in environ-
mental damage) will occur most dramatically in developing coun-
tries. Obtaining a critical mass, therefore, in most instances will
depend on broad-based participation by these countries. 117 The
WTO can provide this. There are approximately 200 countries in
the world. Of those, 133 are presently members of the WTO,
and approximately thirty more have applied for membership.
With minimal exceptions, all member countries are required to
comply with the related agreements governed by the Organiza-
tion. " ' Linking PPM standards to trade agreements would there-
fore ensure the adherence of those countries that wish to maintain
the benefits of membership.
of meeting heightened environmental standards. See supra note 70 and accom-
panying text.
117 To effectively combat global environmental problems, it is important
for all countries that have an impact on the global environment to be parties to
environmental agreements. See Weiss, supra note 31, at 691. It should be noted
that developing countries are not uniformly opposed to global environmental
reforms. See C. Russell H. Shearer, International Environmental Law and De-
velopment in Developing Nations: Agenda Setting, Articulation, and Institutional
Participation, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 391, 397 (1994) (noting the concern by devel-
o ing nations regarding global warming); Green Group Backs Move for Broader
Timber Pact, REUTER EUR. Bus. REP., May 10, 1993 (stating that developing
nations were among those pushing for sustainable felling of both tropical and
temperate forests); Farhan Haq, Disarmament: U.N. Meet Will Test Nuclear
Commitments, Groups Say, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 3, 1997 (noting that de-
veloping countries are outraged by nuclear testing and are now pushing for
"nuclear elimination").
... The text of the WTO Agreement reads, "The agreements and associated
legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 ... are integral parts of this
Agreement, binding on all Members." WTO Agreement art. II, para. 2. Al-
though members are bound by the GATT, and Annexes 1, 2, and 3, Annex 4
sets forth the "Plurilateral Agreements," which are only binding on those
members who have accepted those agreements. Id. art. II, para. 3; see also id.
Annex 4 (containing the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, the Agreement
on Government Procurement, the International Dairy Agreement, and the In-
ternational Bovine Meat Agreement).
Prior to the Uruguay Round, members had the choice of participating in
several specialized, yet significant trade arrangements. See Thomas J. Dillon,
Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for World Trade?, 16
MICH. J. INT'L L. 349, 357 (1995); Harriet R. Freeman, Reshaping Trademark
Protection in Today's Global Village: Looking Beyond GA TT's Uruguay Round
Toward Global Trademark Harmonization and Centralization, 1 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 67, 84 (1995); John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental
Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227, 1271 (1992);
David W. Leebron, An Overview of the Uruguay Round Results, 34 COLuM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 11, 18 (1995).
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Certain developing countries, such as Malaysia, Mexico, and
India, have been fighting particularly hard to keep environmental
concerns off of the WTO's agenda. Developing countries pres-
ently feel that they did not get a very good deal in the Uruguay
Round. At the moment, they are not likely to be convinced to
enter into a new trade round, particularly if environmental stan-
dards are included. The lack of short term political viability,
however, does not change the significant benefits that could be
gained by ultimately winning the battle to integrate environ-
mental agreements into trade negotiations.
5.3.3. Neutralizing Business Opposition
Bringing PPM standards into WTO multilateral negotiations
not only gives developing countries incentives to agree to such
standards, but it can also strengthen the ability of developed coun-
tries to promote such standards. The major internal constraint on
this ability has been anti-environmental lobbying by business in-
terests concerned about the cost of global environmental compli-
ance."' The potency of such lobbying would likely be dimin-
ished if negotiations over PPM standards were brought into
comprehensive trade negotiations. During the negotiations, busi-
ness sectors with anti-environmental agendas will have finite ne-
gotiating capital available and, most likely, a wide range of inter-
ests at stake. As compared to stand-alone negotiations, less
negotiating capital will be available solely to defeat environmental
119 For a general discussion of corporate lobbying against international
economic standards, see WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE:
THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1973). See also William A.
Lovett, Current World Trade Agenda: GATT, Regionalism, and Unresolved
Asymmetry Problems, 62 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2001-07 (1994) (discussing trade re-
lated lobbying activities of multinational corporations in the United States,
Europe, and Japan). For further examples of industries lobbying to influence
American Trade Policy, see W.L Hayhurst, When Sovereignties May Collide-
Sovereignties and the Regulation of Business in Relation to Intellectual Property: A
Canadian Perspective, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 195, 201 (1994) (discussing intellectual
property). See also James H. Snelson, Note, Can GA TTArticle III Recover From
its Head-On Collision With United States-Taxes on Automobiles?, 5 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 467, 478 (1996) (discussing United States auto manufacturers
lobbying Congress); Jeffrey J. Steinle, Note, The Problem Child of World Trade:
Reform Schoo for Agriculture, 4 MINN. 1. GLOBAL TRADE 333, 337 (1995)
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standards. 20 In fact, in comprehensive trade negotiations, these
sectors are more likely to find it in their interest to acquiesce to
environmental provisions. Major export oriented sectors have
tended to gain far more than they have given up in global trade
deals.121 The goal of "keeping negotiations on track," as well as
that of presenting a final package likely to be ratified by domestic
legislative bodies, may militate for acquiescing to environmental
standards.
Once negotiations are concluded and a final agreement is
reached, many corporate sectors are likely to be largely unaffected
by environmental provisions (i.e., finance or telecommunications)
but may benefit from the agreement as a whole. While these sec-
tors would not normally lobby for the ratification of environ-
mental agreements, they would put their resources behind the
selling of an overall trade pact. 122 Even corporate sectors that will
120 Businesses may decide that other issues are of more immediate concern
or of a higher priority than cost savings from anti-environmental measures.
For example, export oriented businesses are likely to be most concerned with
gaining access to foreign markets. See Ivan K. Fong & John Kent Walker, In-
ternational High-Technology Joint Ventures: An Antitrust and Antidumping
Analysis, 7 INT'L TAX & BUS. L. 57, 78 (1989). Businesses may have concerns
regarding domestic tax consequences of new agreements. See Sheldon Yett,
Corporations Bummed Out by Provisions that Fund GA TT at Their Expense,
CORP. FIN. WK., Sept. 19, 1994, at 1 (discussing businesses voicing opposition
to a proposed bill which would increase United States corporate income tax to
fund GATT programs). Every business sector will, of course, have its own
unique agenda. See Robert W. Kastenmeier & David Beier, International Trade
and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 285, 289 (1989); Holly Emrick Svetz, Note, Japan's New Trade Secret Law: We
Asked for it-Now What Have We Got?, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
413, 424 (1992) ("Largely due to the efforts of the Intellectual Property Com-
mittee, a U.S. industry lobby, TRIPs [Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights] proposals have been included in the Uruguay
Round of GATT negotiations.").
121 See Jim Lobe, U.S.-Politics: Sanctions Debate Latest Episode of Identity
Crisis, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 20, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Inpres File; see also Leon Hadar, US Biotech Firms Set Sights on Asia, Bus. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 1995, at 12 (noting that export oriented Silicon Valley companies are
strong sup porters of free trade); William Schneider, Trade Protectionism is
Growing from the Top Down, NAT'L J., Jan. 29, 1983, at 240 (citing studies that
show businesses have historically been opposed to protectionist measures).
122 It has been widely acknowledged that business played an instrumental
role in the decision of the United States to become a member of the WTO. See
Ralph Nader, CITY NEWS SERVICE, July 26, 1996 ("GATT... [is] all big pro-
corporate bills that (President) Clinton pushed through."); Behr,supra note 8
(stating that American corporations, "lobbyists and lawyers worked hand in
hand with U.S. negotiators under three presidents and the congressional trade
committees to set goals [for the WTO]").
1998]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
bear the costs of complying with environmental standards may
well place their support behind the agreement. Having partici-
pated in the process of creating a final deal, they may conclude, as
during negotiations, that the overall benefit from a trade deal
outweighs the anticipated costs of meeting globalized standards.
On the other hand, if environmental agreements are kept separate
from trade negotiations, those corporate sectors that would bear
compliance costs will likely continue to oppose such agreements.
Finally, bringing PPM standards into multilateral WTO nego-
tiations facilitates the opportunity for environmentalists to form
strategic alliances with "protectionist oriented" industries. These
are domestic industries that face stiff import competition and
cannot easily relocate overseas. Characteristically, these industries
lobby to resist allowing domestic market access to foreign goods.
Having failed for the most part, they now have an interest in en-
suring that their overseas competitors at least do not enjoy a cost
advantage as a result of lax environmental standards. They have
not, however, thus far, committed themselves to promoting such
standards. By bringing consideration of such standards into mul-
tilateral trade negotiations where these industries are actively en-
gaged, environmentalists would maximize the likelihood of mobi-
lizing a new ally in the fight for global environmental
standards.
123
123 There, in fact, may be many different kinds of industries that could be-
come allies of environmentalists for many different reasons. For example, cer-
tain large American manufacturers may have an interest in elevated environ-
mental standards. Such an interest is illustrated by the chemical manufacturer
DuPont's support for the Montreal Protocol to phase out ozone-depleting
CFCs. Because DuPont had more resources than its competitors, it perceiveg
that it had an advantage in its ability to develop products that could substitute
for CFCs. See RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY 31 (1991)
(noting that DuPont, along with other leading United States chemical manufac-
turers, announced plans to cease production of CFCs before the imposed dead-
line). More generally, Gabriel Kolko, writing about the progressive era, gives a
number of reasons (which can be applied to global environmental regulation
today) why various corporate sectors in the United States came to support regu-
lation. He identifies these as stability, predictability, and security. See GABRIEL
KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM 3 (1963). Kolko explains his terms
as follows:
Stability is the elimination of internecine competition and erratic fluc-
tuations in the economy. Predictability is the ability, on the basis of
politically stabilized and secured means, to plan future economic ac-
tion on the basis of fairly calculable expectations. Bysecurity I mean
protection from the political attacks latent in any formally democratic
political structure. I do not give to rationalization its frequent defini-
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5.3.4. A Cautious Look at the Benefits ofAlternative Forums
Given the negotiating advantages offered by the WTO, envi-
ronmentalists should be wary of the apparent ease of getting an
agreement in an alternative forum. It is important to weigh the
benefits of what could turn out to be illusory victories in alterna-
tive forums with calculations of how hard to pursue the WTO. A
great deal can be learned in this regard from the 1970s experience
of the Third World's Non-aligned Movement with the United
Nations Conference on Trade and the Development
("UNCTAD").124 The Non-aligned Movement found itself sty-
mied in its attempts to point the GATT in the direction of help-
ing implement the New International Economic Order,125 whose
purpose was to help fundamentally rebalance the inequality in
global income between the north and the south. Frustrated, it
chose UNCTAD as a parallel, though far easier to control forum
in which to attempt to achieve its objectives. 26 While UNCTAD
became the center of a good deal of debate and has attempted to
influence the development of norms related to international
trade, 2 7 the real trade action, which eventually led to the globali-
tion as the improvement of efficiency, output, or internal organization
of a company; I mean by the term, ratier, the organization of the
economy and the larger political and social spheres in a manner that
will allow corporations to function in a predictable and secure envi-
ronment permitting reasonable profits over the long run.
Id.
124 The Third World, and most notably the Non-aligned Movement,
pushed for reforms in the International Economic Order, which led to the
formation of UNCTAD in 1964. See Gloria L. Sandrino, The Nafta Investment
Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259-60 (1994).
125 Developing countries successfully pushed for the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States and proposed the formation of a New International
Economic Order. See No-Hyoung Park, The Third World as an International
Legal System, 7 B.C. THiRD WORLD L.J. 37, 57 (1987).
126 See Jonathan Graubart, What's News: A Progressive Framework for
Evaluating the International Debate Over the News, 77 CAL. L. REv. 629 (1989)
(noting the Non-aligned Movement's influence on various United Nations
agencies during the 1970s); Dr. I. K. Minta, The Lome Convention and the New
International Economic Order, 27 How. L.J. 953 (1984). UNCTAD was to be
an alternative to the unresponsive GATT. See Stephen Zamora, Voting in In-
ternational Economic Organizations, 74AM. J. INT'LL. 566, 580 (1980).
127 Although UNCTAD provided the Third World with a forum to voice
its concerns, the resulting documents "have little substantive value in interna-
tional law." Id.
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zation of the world economy with implications for global distri-
bution of wealth, occurred at the GATT. 2 ' And indeed, much
closer to home, the normative declarations from the United Na-
tions Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio
Conference) 129 and even very important legal instruments, such as
the Convention on Biological Diversity, run the risk of ultimately
being judged as little more than empty promises. 130 It may well
be that certain opponents of global environmental production
standards would be more than willing to recite the beautiful po-
etry promulgated by an alternative organization if, only in ex-
change, the environmentalists will leave the World Trade Organi-
zation alone.
6. CONCLUSION
As the process of globalization proceeds apace, the precise
structure of international governance that will meet the growing
need for international regulation is still evolving. This formative
historical period provides a unique opportunity for those con-
cerned about global ecological welfare to influence the basic struc-
ture of the emerging global environmental regulatory regime. To
take full advantage of this opportunity, the environmental com-
munity must analyze and discuss the implications of various al-
ternative organizational configurations. Thereafter, it will be
necessary to reach some degree of consensus about what would
constitute an effective regulatory structure and take coordinated
action to promote that structure. I have written this Article in
hope of contributing to the primary analysis and discussion. I
have attempted to identify in a way accessible to environmental-
ists the fundamental issues relevant to international environ-
128 See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
129 The Rio Conference has been criticized for its failure to produce bind-
ing and definitive obligations. See Paul H. Brietzke, Insurgents in the "New" In-
ternational Law, 13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1, 26 (1994) ("[T]he Rio Earth Summit was
one grand and very expensive exercise in creating soft law.").
In recent years, a number of multilateral agreements for the protection
of the environment have suffered from either the lack of definitive timetables
and standards, or have been non-binding. The Convention on Biological Di-
versity, for example has been characterized as vague and "impressively opaque."
Klaus Bosselmann, Plants and Politics: The International Legal Regime Concern-
ing Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 111,
136 (1996); see Judy J. Kim, Note, Out of the Law and Into the Field: Harmoniza-
tion of Deliberate Release Regulations for Genetically Modified Organisms, 16
FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1160 (1993).
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mental regulation. Specifically, I have tried to point out the dan-
gers of environmental unilateralism and to demonstrate how in-
ternational environmental regulation could be made more effec-
tive through increased coordination with the WTO regime.
What I have not intended to do is specify a precise architec-
ture for the allocation of environmental regulatory responsibili-
ties between the WTO and other organizations with environ-
mental mandates. No doubt, there are a variety of ways the
WTO's authority can be constitutionally linked to other organi-
zations. A parallel environmental organization, for example,
could be charged with overseeing the environmental aspects of a
comprehensive trade round that is otherwise within the purview
of the WTO. An environmental organization could also, while
operating within the overall framework of the WTO dispute reso-
lution system, be charged with overseeing disputes with environ-
mental implications. While it is beyond the scope of this Article
to explore these possibilities, it is clear that a wide variety of pos-
sible structures could be designed to take advantage of the WTO's
unique negotiating and compliance machinery.
Even if environmentalists speaking with a unified voice were
to make a concerted effort to bring environmental regulation into
the World Trade Organization, success will not come easily. As
experience with the WTO's existing Committee on Trade and the
Environment' 3' has shown, because they understand just how po-
tent an environmental regulator the WTO would be, the foes of
international environmental regulation will fight hard to keep the
Organization from interfering with their "environmental sover-
eignty." This, however, should strengthen, rather than weaken,
the resolve of environmentalists. The unique benefits of winning
the environmental battle for the soul of the World Trade Organi-
zation is likely to make the struggle well worth the effort.
131 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
1998]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
.~c *~c
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss3/3
